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Abstract 
  
 This paper makes an approach to software interoperability. An emphasis is added to 
situations where the lack of interoperability generates several problems.  
 The relation between copyright and competition law are the main subjects to be 
attended, specifically, the relation that those areas have with the interoperability issues. 
 The approach made in this essay is limited to the European Union legal context. The 
Software directive according to the authors’ opinion has several failures that influence 
competition in the EU, these failures will be referred and recommendations presented.  
 The lack of interoperability in the technological market is an issue of great relevance 
due to the high networking effects that characterizes the referred market. This means that a 
new and innovative product that wants to pierce the market will have great difficulty to do so 
if interoperability information’s are not provided by the few dominant undertakings. For 
example: If a new internet browser is created it needs access to the interoperability 
information of the main PC software providers (Windows or Mac OS). If access is not granted 
it would be nearly impossible to introduce this product in the market.  
 The example given usually has competition effects as well as the way we perceive 
the type of intellectual property protection to be granted. 
 
 
Keywords: Interoperability, competition law, copyright, abuse of dominant position, 
interfaces, intellectual property, software, decompilation, reverse engineering, 
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Resumo 
  
 Este trabalho literário faz uma abordagem à questão da interoperabilidade dos 
sistemas informáticos. Enfase é dado às situações onde a falta de interoperabilidade origina 
diversos problemas.  
 A relação entre os direitos de autor e o direito da concorrência são os principais 
temas abordados, mais concretamente a relação dessas áreas com a questão de 
interoperabilidade. 
 A abordagem feita nesta dissertação é limitada ao contexto legal da União Europeia. 
A diretiva de Software de acordo com a opinião do autor contém algumas falhas que 
influenciam a concorrência na UE, essas falhas serão mencionadas e recomendações 
apresentadas. 
 A falta de interoperabilidade no mercado tecnológico é um assunto de grande 
relevância devido á importância dada aos efeitos de networking que caracterizam o referido 
mercado. Isto significa que produtos inovadores que querem entrar no mercado terão grandes 
dificuldades para o fazer caso as informações de interoperabilidade não sejam providenciadas 
pelas empresas dominantes. Por exemplo: Se um novo motor de busca da internet é criado, 
este necessitara de acesso às informações de interoperabilidade por parte dos principais 
fornecedores de software (Windows ou Mac OS). Caso o acesso a essas informações seja 
negado, será virtualmente impossível introduzir o novo produto no mercado. 
 O exemplo providenciado anteriormente por norma, tem efeitos na concorrência 
assim como na forma como percebemos qual o direito de propriedade intelectual utilizado 
para proteger essas informações.  
 
 
Palavras-chave: Interoperabilidade, direito da concorrência, direitos de autor, abuso de 
posição dominante, interfaces, propriedade intelectual, software, decompilação, engenharia 
reversa, direito das telecomunicações, diretiva de Software. 
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Introduction 
  
 First of all, it should be noted that this paper was created in the scope of the LL.M in 
European and Transglobal Business Law. The LL.M program is a diversified program with 
different fields of study such as competition law, tax law, contract law, European Union law, 
international economic law, among others. However, in the year the author attended the 
masters program it did not covered aspects of intellectual property law and this was one of the 
reasons why the author choose the intellectual property field, in order to get acquainted with 
different fields of study besides those that are part of the LL.M curricular semester. Other 
reason for the choice of such theme was the great interest for the technological area and the 
relation and effects that intellectual property and competition law can have in the 
development of such field as well as the influence on how quickly new technologies are 
developed. 
 The author, during the essay will address the question of interoperability between 
software’s. Approaches are to be made in the fields of copyright, competition law, interfaces, 
EU case law, reverse engineering, decompilation, EU lobbying, competition for and in the 
market, telecommunications law, ex-post and ex-ant protection as well as economic and 
philosophical analysis.  
 This study will be limited to the European Union level despite of its global relevance. 
The author, sustains that the European legislation in what concerns access to interface 
information
1
, has many failures and some changes should be made to the Software directive.  
 The legislation that is used in the present day to solve problems of interoperability is 
sometimes ineffective to give a response to the daily development of the technological 
market. 
 
Delimitations 
 
                                                          
1
 Information that gives interoperability with the software. 
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 This essay has many relations with different fields of study, but in this paper the 
analysis made will be limited to the intellectual property and the competition law approach. 
 In the competition law analysis the main focus will be made in the field of abuse of 
dominant position article 102 TFEU. In the intellectual property analysis the focus will be 
made in the area of copyright. Areas of competition law such as cartels and research and 
development in its traditional analysis will be left out of the study scope. In the intellectual 
property area, patents, trademarks, industrial designs and trade dress will be also left aside, 
giving emphasis to copyright. 
 International trade law is relevant when studying this subject, but in this paper the 
author will be limited to the European Union law. 
 It is also important to know that this essay will give some approaches to areas 
beyond law, such as economic, technological and philosophical areas. 
 
Methodologies 
 
The methodology used for writing this essay consists essentially in library based 
research, case law and websites. 
Chapter I is mainly based in legal descriptive research. Chapters II, III and IV are 
based in legal descriptive as well as analytic research were the author introduces his opinion. 
 
Structure 
  
Chapter I consists in introducing the main areas of interest that the essay will deal 
with. It gives a description and a first analysis to general concepts of the study subjects. 
 Chapter II, III and IV are factual chapters that provide core understanding as well as 
opinion about the topic. Chapter II and III are the main providers of knowledge in what 
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concerns the specific questions of the topic. Chapter IV gives possible solutions and 
recommendations to be made. 
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General Introductions to the Topic 
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1. Intellectual Property Rights Focus 
  
 It was in the year 1469 that exclusive printing rights were granted to John Speyer2 
(the inventor of the first printer). Until then copies of books were made by those few ones that 
knew how to read and write and the copying method was made manually with hard work 
involved. Intellectual property is directly linked with innovation, creation and consequently 
economic development. 
When giving authors or inventors a certain level of protection we will be giving them 
the security to protect their inventions and creations and to take the respective economic 
advantages of their hard work. It is not surprising that the countries that offer better protection 
in this field are those ones with higher economic and technologic development. These rights 
aforementioned are of great importance in order to stop free-riders that are always willing to 
collect profits from others work. 
As Galileo Galilei said “…it does not suit me that the invention, which is my property 
and as created by me with great effort and cost, should become the common property of just 
anyone…”3. IP laws do provide the innovator the possibility of having a monopoly on the 
protected product.  
Intellectual property can be a very controversial issue since this can be perceived as a 
way of controlling common knowledge and our thoughts; many might argue that information 
needs to be free; others might think that intellectual property is outdated. 
 With the introduction of cyberspace, intellectual property rights might be something 
impossible to control. Information since the early times is considered a valuable asset. There 
will always exist someone trying to profit with it, on the other hand, information is nowadays 
more and more accessible and disperse, because of the new methods of communication. 
 One of the ways that humans found to protect this asset was through laws. We should 
perceive the clash between IP rights and the increasingly technological world as an 
opportunity to find a balance between those who promote the technology revolution and those 
                                                          
2 Forrester, Ian S. “"Regulating Intellectual Property via Competition? Or Regulating Competition via Intellectual Property? Competition and 
Intellectual Property: Ten Years On, the Debate Still Flourishes".” European Competition Law Annual (2005), pp. 59. 
3 Lehmann, M. “"Property and Intellectual Property - Property Rights and Restrictions on Competition in Furtherance of Competition".” 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (1989), p.8. 
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who promote the creation of inventive and creative works, and this should be achieved by 
having respect for both.  
 Let us imagine now that we are consulting a video on some random website, the video 
that we are watching is possibly protected as a motion picture work, the website is considered 
a literary work, the software that runs the video is also a literary work, the browser you use is 
considered a computer program as the operating system of your device. There are also many 
components of your computer or devices that have patents, the name of your device is a 
registered trademark, the search algorithms that are used on the web are trade secrets.  
If we see this underground world in this way it might seem complicated, however, 
everything in our daily life runs with a strange fluidity. We can compare this with our internal 
organs, if we analyse the function of each of the organs it would be extremely complicated, 
however, without even noticing, everything functions in a perfect harmony. 
 When we are talking about IP, is when the subject makes an input of all the aspects 
that led him to the creation of an idea, this idea is protected if it generates to a form in which 
the humans can gain access. In its pure form IP is the embodiment of intellectual effort and 
talent.  
IP rights are territorial, and typically applied only to the nations were they were filed. 
However, some development was made with the signature of international treaties. These 
treaties have standards, for example, for how long a patent lasts. The national legislations can 
provide higher standards for these subjects, but, they cannot disrespect the minimum 
standards that are contracted in the treaties.  
 The most important minimum standard that countries must provide deals with the 
National Treatment principle that consists of providing to foreigners the same treatment as 
provided to the nationals. IP rights influence the economic markets. Sellers of goods and 
services are more likely to sell to a country that provides strong IP rights. 
 IP rights also bring some conflicts between different parts of the world. Developed and 
developing nations have different ways of perceiving IP.  
Developed nations always try to receive full economic benefits from their inventions 
with strong IP rights. They think that strong IP rights are crucial to protect the immense 
investment made on the development and creation of these products, for example, 
 - 22 - 
 
pharmaceuticals products have high costs associated with its development, and creators want 
a return on their investment. They also argue that strong IP rights will enhance trade because 
their partners will have the confidence to export the products. Developing nations in the other 
side argue that they need access to the inventions and knowledge, which are the tools they 
need to get better development and modernization and its crucial for them to compete. They 
see strong IP rights as a tool to deny access to technology and knowledge or to restrict access 
through high prices and royalties that they cannot afford. It seems an open question to know 
who is right about this. 
 The oldest and most important international legislation on this subject is the Berne 
Convention
4
 for the protection of literary and artistic work. After the Berne Convention, came 
the Paris Convention on Industrial Property that was initially signed by 11 countries and after 
the World War II the signatory members increased
5
.   
 However, this convention lacks the enforcement system required to protect IP. When a 
country violates a treaty, there is no effective way to punish them. We could, resort to the 
International Court of Justice; however, no cases have been brought to this mechanism.  
Many of these problems were solved through the TRIPs
6
 agreement that came with the 
Treaties of the WTO, it provided minimum standards relative to copyrights, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, topographies of integrated circuits and 
trade secrets that are mandatory for states to provide in their national legislations. For 
example: TRIPs prevents WTO members from denying patents in pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology issues (this was a problem before the WTO because in the previous treaties 
there were no requirement for minimum standards and states could just simply claim that for 
issues of public health, no protection was going to be given to pharmaceuticals products). The 
TRIPs do have some enforcement mechanisms that provide some protection; however, these 
treaties are signed between states and not between private entities, this means that fines are 
going to be applied to member states and no compensation is given to privates. 
                                                          
4Seville, Catherine. “"Copyright and Related Rights".” EU Intellectual Property Law and Policy (2009), p.9. 
5 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883. 
6 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.html , last seen in 25-06-2015. See also, supra note, 4 p.17. 
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 Another way of protecting IP rights is the WIPO
7
 which currently has one hundred 
and eighty eight signatory member states, this organization belongs to one specialized body of 
the UN and was created to promote creativity and at the same time, promote protection of IP 
rights throughout the world
8
. 
 
1.1. The copyright approach 
  
 Intellectual property is an asset that has gained through time more and more 
importance, even more with the rise of the new technologies that give the common user 
means to easily reproduce many kinds of works
9
 that are protected by IP rights. 
 IP rights are in their nature national in what concerns the scope of application but 
with the increased globalization in commerce, trade, technology, etc., there was an ever-
growing importance in harmonizing the different legal systems.  
 The European Union and all countries around the world have realized that 
intellectual property is a huge precursor of economic development and innovation and 
different approaches have been taken in what concerns the protection of these subjects (in 
copyright: the “common law and the civil law approach”, where the first one gives more 
emphasis to the economic context and the second one gives more importance to the authors 
rights)
10
.  
 In what concerns interoperability, we must take into special account the copyright 
and the trade secret. 
 Copyrights were born due to the appearance of the printer, which made possible 
copying in large quantities books that until then were only copied by the few people that knew 
how to read and write and it was a hard and long work to be made
11
. Since then copyright has 
                                                          
7 See, supra note 3 pp. 19-23. 
8 http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/trtdocs_wo029.html, preamble, second paragraph.  Last seen in 12-06-2015. 
9 Lévêque, François and Yann Ménière. “"The Economics of Patents and Copyright".” Berkeley Electronic Press (2004) p.76. 
10 See, supra note 3, p.7. 
11 Ibid. p.7. 
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expanded too many different areas such as the music industry, books, plays, art works, dance, 
computer programs, films and photography
12
. 
 Copyright unlike patents only protects against the copying of a work but does not 
protect the ideas embodied in that work, the functionality of the referred work. In order to 
given copyright protection it must exist originality. According to the Berne convention the 
work of an author is protected during his lifetime and plus fifty years
13
. However, it could 
have a longer protection, for example, under European law, the work is protected during the 
authors life and plus seventy years
14
. 
 With the introduction of the internal market in the EU the free movement of goods, 
persons, capital and services was implemented. With the freedoms also came many legislative 
acts to harmonize national legislations, this happened in many fields and IP was not an 
exception.  
 As regards copyright we have in the European Union the Directive 2001/29/CE, 
which aims to harmonize aspects related to copyright and rights related to technological 
developments to the information society, this directive deals primarily with three main 
subjects: the reproduction rights, the right of communication and distribution rights.  
 The reproduction right states that “Member States are to provide for the exclusive 
right to authorize or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any 
means and any forms, in whole or in part”15 of the respective works.  
 The right of communication deals with the fact that “Member States are to provide 
authors with the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit any communication to the public of 
copies of their works, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them”16.  
 At last, the distribution right deals with the harmonization for authors with the 
“exclusive right of distribution to the public of their works or copies thereof. This distribution 
                                                          
12 See, supra note 8, pp.61, 62. 
13 Article 7 of Berne Convention 
14 See, supra note, 4 p.58. See also supra note 3, p.8. 
15 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1446042606029&uri=URISERV:l26053 , last seen in 28-10-2015. 
16 See, supra note 13. 
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right is exhausted where the first sale or first other transfer of ownership in the Community of 
a copy is made by the right-holder or with his consent.”17 
 Another important directive is the directive 2009/24/EC Software Directive that 
deals with the legal protection of computer programs. This began with the 1985 White Paper 
followed by the Green Paper, the Commission after a public consultation issued one first 
Proposal and after intense lobbying efforts on the interoperability subject the first 
consolidated version appeared in 1991 and after some amends we have now the version of 
2009
18
. Further development will be made. 
  
1.2. Idea/Expression dichotomy 
 
Before moving one there needs to be made a reference to the idea/expression 
dichotomy that will give us a background to the analysis of what might be protectable under 
copyright. 
The idea/expression dichotomy is an idea intrinsically linked with the development 
of copyright framework and with the analysis of what is indeed suitable for this kind of 
protection. This means that the protection should be given to the expression of the idea and 
not to the idea itself, the problem is to draw a line that separates these terms and to know 
exactly where one begins and the other ends. 
Article 9/2 TRIPs is a perfect example of such theory “Copyright protection shall 
extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts as such.”19 But as it was said, this is not as linear as it seems because of the labor 
taken in developing ideas and the costs associated with the creative process that should be 
taken into consideration when speaking of copyright
20
. 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
18 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs. 
19 Article 9 (2) TRIPS Agreement. 
20 Rosati, Eleonora. "Illusions Perdues The Idea/Expression Dichotomy at Crossroads". Cambridge: Newnham College, n.d. p.9. 
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We can say that the ideas that remain the intellect, in the mind of a thinker should not 
have protection and those ideas that “leave” the intellect of an author and are transferred to a 
written or material form, to a tangible source could be a candidate to such protection.  
In what concerns the new applications of copyright such as in the software market, 
things have turned even more complicated and the differentiation of the idea/expression is 
increasingly more difficult. The program code that has the function of giving “orders” to the 
computer is protected as literary work but the idea of a software, the functions that it performs 
are not. If there is a software that gives instructions to a computer to make us a cup of tea, the 
idea of making a computer serving tea is not protected, only the code that constitutes the 
software, this means that a programmer can create a different code with the same objective (to 
make a cup of tea).  
The choice of the commands and algorithms maybe protected by copyright but the 
ideas and algorithms themselves are not, interfaces are formed of both copyrightable and non-
copyrightable characteristics, the expression of the algorithms chosen maybe copyrightable as 
in the other hand they have functional characteristics that would be more prone to patent 
protection than to copyright
21
. 
It is hard to apply the idea/expression dichotomy because there are no guidelines and 
no previous situations where there was a need to apply such distinction. Situations can appear 
in many forms with differing results from case to case. Copyright law should also leave some 
attention to expressions that can be protectable or non-protectable
22
. The European Union 
legislation is also very ambiguous when referring to the interface protection. 
 
1.3. Competition Law Focus 
 
1.3.1. Competition Law (Anti-trust) 
  
                                                          
21 Heindl, Petra. “"A Status Report from the Software Decompilation Battle: A Source of Sores for Software Copyright Owners in the United 
States and European Union?".” TLF Working Papers 2008 pp. 9 and 10. 
22 See, supra note 18, p.43. 
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 EU competition rules deals with four categories of potentially anti-competitive 
actions. The first category is the agreements between competitors (Article 101 TFEU); the 
second category is the abuse of a dominant position (Article 102 TFEU)
23
; the third category 
is the Mergers (EMCR)
24
 and the fourth category is the State Aids (Articles 107-109 TFEU). 
 The European Commission is primarily in charge of enforcing competition rules, 
although national courts can also be responsible for the application of such rules. 
  Initially the main objective of competition law was to build the Common Market. 
However, through time and with the implementation of the common market and coin, a 
reform of the purposes was made and competition law gained new purposes. With a new 
political agenda, consumer well-being and the protection of the market participants is the 
spotlight of competition law as Professor Pedro Froufe writes
25
. 
 To talk about EU competition law we need first to do an approach to article 101 
TFEU. 
 In article 101(1) we can perceive that only behaviours that distort competition are 
going to fall within the scope of this provision, and furthermore that behaviour needs to come 
from an undertaking
26
. 
 Because the provision does not give us a definition of undertaking, this issue was left 
for the EU courts to decide. 
 In case “Hofner and Elser vs Macroton GMBH”27 the court of justice held that an 
undertaking is every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal status. 
 What is considered an economic activity? An economic activity is going to consist 
on the offer of goods or services on a given market (the Pavlov case
28
); organizations that 
don’t have as its main purposes economic motives can be putted in the sphere of this 
                                                          
23 Wish, Richard and David Bailey. "Competition Law". Oxford University Press, 2015, p.175. 
24 See, supra note 21, p. 829. 
25Froufe, Pedro. "A Reforma do Direito Comunitário da Concorrência: O Sentido Descentralizador e/ou Re-Centralizador do Regulamento 
(CE) Nº 1/2003". Braga: Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, 2009, p.50 et seq. 
26 For Further development see, supra note 21, pp.82-150. 
27 Case C-41/90, Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 April 1991. - Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbHCase  para 21. 
28 Case C-180/98, Judgment of the Court of 12 September 2000, Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten. 
para 75. 
 - 28 - 
 
provision. Even if a company is acting as a natural person or under the State authority, they 
may be found considered undertakings. 
 Activities that are not economic like: non-profit activities connected with the 
exercise of  powers of a public authority, the professions and employees as trade unions, are 
also not considered to be in the scope of this provision. 
 A parent company for all purposes can be considered liable for actions of its 
subsidiary
29
. 
 Article 101 TFEU is not limited in the field of contracts. The main objective and 
purpose of these provisions is to eliminate cooperation agreements, decisions and concerted 
practice that influence and distort competition in the EU level. Article 101 TFEU can be 
applied to horizontal or vertical agreements (this is, between agreements of undertakings at 
the same level of market or agreements between undertakings of different levels of the 
market, respectively). All agreements that have as their objective price fixing, exchanging 
information on future behaviour, sharing market quotes, limiting outputs, limiting sales, 
imposing fixed or minimum resale prices, imposing export bans; will be caught by the scope 
of article 101(1) TFEU. Also, agreements that have as their effects the distortion of 
competition will be in the scope of the same. 
 Passing on to article 101(3) TFEU, we can see that there are some exceptions on the 
application of article 101(1) TFEU.  
 Article 101(1) TFEU shall not be applied if four conditions are fulfilled
30
. The first 
two conditions are positive and the last two are negative. 
 (1) It must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promote technical or economic progress, (2) while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, (3) must not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, (4) shall not afford such undertakings 
the possibility of eliminating competition in a substantial part of the products in question. 
                                                          
29Case C-73/95, Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 24 October 1996, Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities. 
para 16. 
30 See, supra note 21, p.83. 
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 We can perceive that these two articles are of extreme importance to the 
interpretation of IP rights. These two competition law articles are of great relevance when 
striking a balance between competition and IP rights. 
 
1.4. Competition and Intellectual Property 
 
1.4.1. Balancing IP and Competition in the EU 
 
The conflict between IP law and anti-trust goes back to the classic contributions of 
two distinguished authors, Joseph Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow. 
Schumpeter theory claims that the removal of competition and market concentration 
could eventually lead to better innovation processes and consequently, decrease product 
prices
31
. This would happen because big companies, large firms, with high market shares, 
would be in better position and in better economic conditions to spend more in research and 
development
32
. 
Arrow, on the other hand, focused on the negative effects that the lack of competition 
and monopoly companies will have on competition
33
.  
According to Arrow, a monopolist firm with no market competition will invest less 
in R&D, by sharing the profits of new technologies with the old ones. If we have companies 
with competition in the market, those companies are more likely to invest more in R&D to 
gain market share
34
. 
Monopolist powers are detrimental to competition and R&D. A monopolist power 
will have fewer tendencies to increase investment in R&D. The fact is that R&D is a big 
expense that companies have, it is a big hole in their budget, and if companies could have the 
same sales of a product without expending resources in R&D they would likely do so. If there 
are no market competitors, the market share would be absolute, and monopolistic companies 
                                                          
31 Czapracka, Katarzyn. "Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust". Edward Elgar, (2009) p.39. 
32 For further development see, McCraw, Thomas K. “"Joseph Schumpeter on Competition".” Competition Policy International (2008); and 
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1950, “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”. 
33 See, supra note 29, p.40. 
34 For further developments see, Nelson, R. R. "Economic Welfare and Allocation of Resources to Invention" Arrow, Kenneth J. 1962. 
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wouldn’t have to worry with the loss of clients to other companies. On the other hand if a 
company has fierce competition, like Arrow stated, there will be a concern to increase its 
market share, and to do so, they will need to innovate their products and create new ones, 
expending more in R&D.  
For the purposes of this subject it is important to refer to the authors Baxter, 
Bowman and Kaplow. These authors tried to give an appropriate balance to the volume of 
profits that should be made through IP rights.  
Baxter believed that profits coming from a patent should be restricted to the patent 
system, should be confined as narrowly and specifically as possible
35
. 
Bowman believed that patent owners should have the chance to extract the profits by 
any means available, as long as the profits come from the superiority and innovative character 
of the patent, without exceeding the character of the patent
36
. 
Kaplow has a different approach to the balance of IP profits and anti-trust law. 
Kaplow suggests that anti-trust rules do not only balance the amount of profit that the patent 
owners should have but also the way they collect those profits
37
. He argued that IP monopoly 
rights should be allowed as long as their anti-competitive effects do not exceed the social 
benefits and do not outweigh the future incentives in R&D. However, he also argues that 
strong IP rights in conjugation with soft anti-trust laws do not bring high standards of 
competition to the market. In Kaplow´s eyes competition stimulates innovation
38
.  
IP law and anti-trust law were created to correct imbalances on the market
39
. IP law 
was created to incentivize innovation and R&D
40
. IP laws were designed to protect private 
investors, normally the products of such development are made public (to generate profit), 
and if unprotected would lead to reproductions from other companies. The problem rises 
when these companies copy a product with which they didn’t had any kind of costs on the 
development and research, the research and development of a product usually leads to high 
                                                          
35 Baxter, William F. “"Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis".” Yale Law Journal (1996). See 
also, supra note 29, p.40. 
36 Bowman, Ward S. "Patent and Anti-Trust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal". 1973 
37 See supra note 29, pp. 41-42. 
38 Kaplow, Louis. “"The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal".” Harvard Law Review (1984)”. 
39 Ghidini, Gustavo and Edward Elgar. "Intellectual Property and Competition Law", (2006), p. 99. See also, supra note 29, p.36. 
40 Something important for the society evolution and mankind as specie. 
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expenses: in staff, materials and time
41
. Protecting the investor will give him the opportunity 
to have returns for the expenses made, and possibly profit.  
Intellectual property is something incorporeal, this is: if we eat a steak, it can no 
longer be consumed by anyone else. What happens with IP is the opposite, if we “consume” a 
literary work that work can easily be available for a second consumer and so on. Another 
example to illustrate this situation can be the one of a house: to copy a house, the costs 
associated will be the costs of building the first house, with IP the situation changes, this is, to 
produce one book, one music, one film, there needs to exist a certain investment, and to copy 
this film or book, in the modern world, is very cheap or sometimes with no costs associated. 
This is the reason why IP should have a certain degree of protection, so that those who make 
the initial investment can recoup it and make profit. 
On the other side, anti-trust laws were created and developed to correct the imbalances 
of the market, like it was previously explained, these laws prevent the use of strategies that 
could lead to monopoly situations, cartels, concerted practices etc.  
Anti-trust law seeks to increase competition in the market; this competition will 
probably lead to a gradual decrease of prices to the general population. The opposite happens 
when dealing with IPR
42
; IPR restricts access to products and may lead to an increase of 
prices of some products, making them unavailable to many people
43
. 
High protection in the field of IP could probably lead to negative effects on 
competition. 
EU anti-trust competent authorities, give great concern to the correction of what they 
consider faulty IP rights. They regulate the amount of profits that an agent should have, taking 
the excess out and controlling possible detriments to competition. 
Many anti-competitive actions from large companies pass through the invalid 
enforcement and exercise of IP rights, which lead to violations in the competition law area. 
                                                          
41 See, supra note 1, p.65. 
42 Lowe, Philip and Luc Peeperkorn. “"Intellectual Property: How Special is its Competition Case?".” European Competition Law Annual 
(2005) pp.91-92. 
43 These generates more problems when dealing with products that can be crucial: for health issues for example. 
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This happens when companies with higher power impede market access through invalid IP 
rights and licensing agreements
44
 that constrict the ability to innovate
45
. 
The balance between IP rights and anti-trust law is a delicate subject
46
. It is well 
known that protective anti-trust laws cause detrimental effects to innovation as well as to 
R&D. No company would spend high amounts of money, if they then were faced with their 
rivals copying their products without punishment. On the other hand, if higher protection is 
given to IP rights and soft lenient anti-trust laws are in place, large companies are likely to 
impede other market players to enter or compete in the free market. A balance must be made 
between these two areas
47
. The author believes that anti-trust authorities should give 
guidelines to the admissible profit that one company should take in comparison to what was 
spent in the development of such product; they should also ascertain how those profits are 
claimed. We also cannot forget that nowadays the interoperability of products is crucial and 
many times one IP right can close the market for other competitors in similar areas of 
operations
48
. 
The Microsoft case is a good example on how the authorities interfered in a IP rights 
situation that was detrimental to competition. 
Microsoft did not disclose interoperability information of their PC operating system, 
crucial for internet browsers to function well. In the same time, Microsoft created an internet 
browser (Internet Explorer) that benefited from that interoperability mechanism with the 
operating system. Microsoft had the dominant position in the market of operating systems. 
Using that advantage of dominant position in the market to “sell” another product that was not 
an operating system but instead an internet browser, leaving aside the other internet browsers. 
The Commission ruled in favour of the other browsers, obliging Microsoft to disclose 
interoperability information so that other internet browsers could gain access to the market
49
. 
                                                          
44 Begoña, Gonzalez. “"Compelling Disclose Software Interoperable Information" volume 16.” The Journal of World Intellectual Property 
(2013)” pp. 6-9. 
45 Scotchmer, Vid. S. “"Innovation and Incentives".” MIT Press Cambridge (2004)”, p. 134. 
46 See, supra note 29, pp.37-38. 
47 See, supra note 37, p. 104. 
48 Ibid. pp. 104-106. 
49 Case T-201/4, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the 
European Communities. 
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The European Union approach in what concerns the new technology market is one of 
reluctance and control. The Commission focuses its attention mainly in the vertical 
integration and in the defective providence of the interoperability information’s required for 
other competitors to enter in the market. Dominant companies are not required to disclose 
interoperability information of its systems, however, when the access to that interoperability 
is used to gain market power in another field or market, it will probably be considered an 
anticompetitive measure
50
 
The technological market is a market that raises problems with the balancing of IP and 
anti-trust, this because within the technological market we usually have one or two companies 
that are dominant and many times they are likely to gain access to other markets through their 
dominant position, restraining the access to other competitors. The intervention of the 
Commission in the authors’ perspective is at the moment necessary to control the market 
failures. A problem can arise because dominant companies are going to be obliged to disclose 
their technology to rivals; this could possibly lead to a decrease of research and development, 
and could act as a disincentive. 
 
1.4.2. Vertical Restraints 
 
The IPR owners have the characteristic of having the right to contract with companies 
the price and impose terms on exploitation and selling conditions, as well as restraints and 
refusals to deal. 
The European Commission views the price restraints in licensing distributions 
agreements with a certain suspicion and most likely these agreements are going to fall within 
the scope of article 101 TFEU. 
However, since the late 1990s the Commission liberalized the application of article 
101(3) giving greater flexibility on the interpretation of these types of contracts, it was 
recognized that these contracts could have a positive impact on competition. 
                                                          
50 See: “Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows”, at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-15_en.htm last seen in 23-06-2015. 
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In what concerns these vertical agreements the first block exemption appeared in 1984 
with the block exemption
51
 related to IP licensing
52
. The Commission created the “white list” 
containing the clauses and situations that did not constitute violation of article 101(1) 
[previous article 81(1)], and the “black list” which referred to the situations that were not 
allowed. 
In 1996 the Commission created the Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation (TTBER)
53
 and there was a larger flexibility, giving an extensive list on “white 
clauses” and shorter list of “black clauses”.  
In 2004 there was a reform of the TTBER, striving for an economic approach rather 
than a formalistic one. With this reform the “black list”54 was again reduced and shortened. 
This does not mean that resale price fixing is now considered a “white clause”, on the 
contrary, it is considered to be a “severely anticompetitive restraint”55. A company doing this 
type of agreement can always come before the Commission and claim that the agreement has 
pro-competitive effects, however, the burden of proof will fall in the scope of the company 
and it will be a very difficult task to convince the Commission of those effects. 
There is more and more a need to approach these subjects and make a good balance 
between IP and anti-trust with an economic mindset in order to achieve the total potential in 
innovation and R&D and at the same time protect consumers from monopolistic entities that 
only function to the detriment of competition. Philosophical approaches are out of date and 
pragmatic ones are the most relevant to the function of the market.  
From what it was said, one could think that IP and Competition are conflicting areas 
with different interests, however, when analyzing this subjects in a higher level, we easily 
realize that these two areas do pursue the same objectives. Both want to enhance consumer 
welfare and incentivize R&D as well as innovation, the difference here is when these 
incentives are made. IP gives incentives in an ex-ante regime and Competition gives 
incentives in an ex-post regime. 
                                                          
51 See, supra note 21, p.640-645. 
52 Commission Regulation 2349/84 of 23 July 1984. See also supra note 21, pp. 617-626. 
53 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 240/96 of 31 January 1996. 
54 See, supra note 21, pp. 159-172. 
55 See TTBER, Recital 13 and Article 4 and also Technology Transfer Guidelines.  
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IP is directed to, in a first instance incentivize R&D investment: it states what is and 
what is not protected, it gives security to the investor, it says to the investor that he will be 
able to recoup the investment made and possibly make a profit and if someone tries to free-
ride he will not be successful (it’s a previous stage, a legislative stage). In the other hand we 
have competition laws that are the ex-post incentives; this ex-post approach is individualized 
and is made case-by-case, it is in fact more accurate but also more expensive and time 
consuming due to the formalities that courts are attached to. Both give protection but in 
distinct levels and with distinct characteristics
56
 (this issue will be further addressed).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Roijen, Ashwin Van. "The Software Interface Between Copyright and Competition Law, a Legal Analysis of Interoperability in Computer 
Programs". Kluwer Law International, 2010, p. 103 sq. 
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1. First approach to Interoperability 
 
1.1. Interoperability Context 
 
Interoperability in the technological world is a subject of great controversy, even more 
the lack of it. Interoperability is the ability of a product to connect with other products 
through the exchange of information
57
. Our PCs are subject to hundreds of interoperability 
connections, between the hardware, the software and the innumerous applications that we 
have the ability to install. Interoperability can be vertical or horizontal, horizontal 
interoperability exists in the same PC as it was previous described and vertical 
interoperability is the communication between different operating systems
58
. 
The horizontal interoperability is used to create a new operating system that would be 
compatible with the existing application programs. Vertical interoperability is normally used 
by application program developers to interoperate with the dominant software providers. 
Software providers will tend to disclose vertical interoperability information’s and keep in 
secret horizontal interoperability information’s59. 
In the commercial market enterprises normally evolve independently from their rivals, 
but in the technological world this is not what happens. Let’s think for example in a computer 
game, the creator of the computer game needs to gain access to the interoperability interfaces 
of the operating system so that the game can run in perfect conditions, without this ability to 
exchange information the game would not run.  
The technological market has a special appreciation in what concerns networking
60
, let 
us now think about the smartphones, it is well known that there are only two main suppliers of 
operating systems, and those are iOS and Android. If we want any kind of application for our 
smartphones we go to the respective “stores” and we have a wide variety of apps, for both of 
them.  
                                                          
57 See, supra note, 40 p. 3. 
58 See, supra note 19, pp. 33-37. 
59 Ibid. p. 36. 
60 See, supra note 29, pp. 81-82. 
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Now let us imagine that an enterprise that produces operating systems for smartphones 
wants to enter in the market and let us name it “newos”. Newos is free to enter in the market, 
the problem here is that all those thousands of apps that are now available for iOS and 
android will not be available in the newos store and consumers are reluctant to change from 
the security that iOS and android nowadays provide. Consumers already know how the 
operating systems work and they know that they have available thousands of apps in their 
respective stores. Networking in the technological market is appealing for consumers and 
undertakings. 
The technological market is many times controlled by few dominant companies that if 
not controlled can disrupt competition, R&D and innovation. If interoperability information is 
not provided for those who want to create a new product in the downstream markets it could 
lead to vertical restraints and foreclosure of an entire market
61
, giving indirect monopoly in 
the downstream market to companies that are dominant in the upstream market. 
The IP laws as well as competition laws are ill suited for the fast development of the 
technological market; this because IP and Competition many times prohibit the disclosure of 
vital information’s and cooperation between competitors, this way of thinking goes against 
the fundamental need of interoperability in the new technologies. “Sharing among 
competitors is not warmly embraced by these laws”62. 
However, looking at the telecommunications law of the EU
63
 we can perceive that 
advances have been made in some areas that welcome and embrace the interoperability and 
maybe, if comparing the legislation approved in this area we could take some ideas to develop 
a special legislation to the IT market. 
 
1.2. Technical Terms 
 
                                                          
61 See, supra note 40, p.5. 
62 See supra note 52, p. 10. 
63 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002. 
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Software: software is the set of instructions that make the hardware work, 
transforming the useless machinery into the interactive tool that we are all so used to
64
. The 
most well known with the general public are: Mac, Windows and Linux. These are the 
operating systems, the software. We can then have other type of software, the applications 
programs, these programs are for example: the internet browsers that we use to access 
internet, the media players, the word programs (Microsoft office word and Pages), among 
others.  
The operating system has many times the job to connect these application programs to 
the hardware, it has the job to link the machinery to the application program, and these 
application programs many times are developed by companies that have nothing to do with 
the company that developed the operating system per se. However, the distinction between 
application program and operating system is sometimes unclear and hard to define
65
. 
A computer program can only read binary code, this is, it can only read ones and 
zeros, and this is called the object code, but this type of code is unreadable for humans. The 
programming language was than created, this is, the object code is transformed into source 
code (written orders and commands) that is human readable
66
. For example, to shut down 
your PC (if you have the windows operating system), you can write “shutdown/r/o” and this 
written command in English has behind it an object code that is composed by a binary code of 
ones and zeros that communicates and gives the order to the computer to shut down
67
. 
The operating system is not distributed in source code, it is distributed in object code 
and as Dr. Ashwin van Roijen wrote, source code is many times compared to a recipe, “one 
may enjoy a dish prepared according to a recipe that cannot easily be extracted from the 
meal”68. But unlike the recipe we can extract the source code from the object code that we 
have access by decompiling, and this is the act of reversing the object code into readable 
                                                          
64 See Directive 2009/24/EC para. 10. “Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and Analysis.” Vanderbilt Law Review (1994) p. 
149. Supra note 19, p.7. 
65 Case Comp/C-3/37.792, EC Commission v. Microsoft pp. 800-813. 
66 Samuelson, Pamela, Thomas Vinje and William Cornish. “"Does Copyright Protection under the Software Directive Extend to Computer 
Program Behaviour, Languages and Interfaces?".” European Intellectual Property Review (n.d.). p.159. See also “Reverse Engineering of 
Software for Interoperability and Analysis.” Vanderbilt Law Review (1994) pp. 149-50. 
67 See, supra note 19, pp. 7 and 8. 
68 See, supra note 52, p. 12. 
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source code. Usually the source code is not open; however the operating system Linux does 
have an open source code. 
Interoperability is achieved through access to the interface. Interface in the computer 
sciences is the point where control between two devices is achieved, between the user and the 
operational system, between the hardware and the application programs or between two 
applications. The interface in the hardware are the physical connections that make the bridge 
between two devices, a perfect example is the USB connections that we are used to.  
Interfaces in software systems are called APIs (application program interfaces) and the APIs 
are basically codes and messages used by programs to communicate among them
69
. For this 
purpose we can look at Directive 2009/24/EC: 
“(10) The function of a computer program is to communicate and work together with 
other components of a computer system and with users and, for this purpose, a logical and, 
where appropriate, physical interconnection and interaction is required to permit all elements 
of software and hardware to work with other software and hardware and with users in all the 
ways in which they are intended to function. The parts of the program which provide for such 
interconnection and interaction between elements of software and hardware are generally 
known as ‘interfaces’. This functional interconnection and interaction is generally known as 
‘interoperability’; such interoperability can be defined as the ability to exchange information 
and mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.”70 
  
APIs are divided into two: the interface specification and the interface 
implementation
71
. The interface specification is embodied in the object code of the program 
and it says how to interact with the program in question. The interface implementation is the 
practical part of the interface, it is the part of the interface that makes the interoperability with 
other programs, one is the theory and the second is the practice. 
The problem here is that the IT market has already said, is normally dominated by one 
or two companies that become the standard in their product (like Windows and Mac), and if 
                                                          
69 See, supra note 19, p.34. 
70 See, Directive 2009/24/EC. 
71 See, supra note 52, p. 15. 
 
 - 42 - 
 
there is no access to the interfaces of these two operating systems there will be no chance to 
enter in the downstream market. Remembering the Microsoft case we can see that the lack of 
interoperability closed a downstream market. 
One way of getting access to the interfaces interoperability is through reverse 
engineering
72
. Reverse engineering can be explained through the recipe example. One can eat 
a very tasty meal prepared by a famous chef and realize that the recipe has vinegar, salsa, salt, 
pepper, cheese, etc. and knowing that, the person can go home and try to reproduce the recipe, 
however, that person does not know how the meal was prepared, he doesn’t know the dosages 
of the ingredients, for how long was the steak cooked, and even if it was used any special 
ingredient that escape his analysis.  
It can also be seen as “going backwards through the development cycle”73. We can 
have two types of reverse engineering, in the first situation, the programmer has access to the 
source code that is already available in the operating system, but the higher level aspects are 
not known
74
; in the second situation, there is no access to the source code and the discovery of 
the source code is made through the object code. This last method is a mechanical method. 
The first method is called the black box
75
 method and it consists only in observing how the 
program works, the programmer knows what the software does but he does not know how it 
was done. It’s a method that looks at the functionality but does not peek into the internal 
structure.  
The programmers can make use of the clean room technique; this is a way of copying 
a design without infringing copyright and trade secrets associated to the product
76
.It is 
sometimes called clean room design because engineers reverse engineer the program giving it 
a different aspect (avoiding copyright infringements). 
                                                          
72 Samuelson, Pamela and Suzanne Scotchmer. "The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering. n.d. p.27. See also “Reverse Engineering 
of Software for Interoperability and Analysis.” Vanderbilt Law Review (1994) pp. 150-154. See also Band, Jonathan and Masanobu Katoh. 
“"Interfaces on Trial 2.0".” The MIT Press (2011)” pp. 18-19. 
73 Warden, R. "Software Reuse and Reverse Engineering in Practice". London, England: Chapman & Hall, 1992. 
pp. 283-305. 
74 “Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and Analysis.” Vanderbilt Law Review (1994). 
p. 151. 
75 See, supra note 62; p.161.  See, supra note 40; p.4. See also supra note 19, pp. 56-59. 
76 For further development see: Deck, Michael. “"Cleanroom Review Techniques for Application Development".” International Conference 
on Software Quality”. 1996. 
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Now, one can ask about the legality of reverse engineering
77
. The answer is in 
Directive 2009/24/EC (on the legal protection of computer programs). Reading the directive 
we can easily perceive that the unauthorized reproduction or transformation is unlawful 
except when it is made to gain interoperability access. The knowledge acquired by reverse 
engineering cannot be used to compete in the horizontal market; this is, to compete in the 
same market as the product that suffered the reverse engineering technique.  
 
Directive 2009/24/EC paragraph 15 reads: “The unauthorized reproduction, 
translation, adaptation or transformation of the form of the code in which a copy of a 
computer program has been made available constitutes an infringement of the exclusive rights 
of the author. Nevertheless, circumstances may exist when such a reproduction of the code 
and translation of its form are indispensable to obtain the necessary information to achieve the 
interoperability of an independently created program with other programs. It has therefore to 
be considered that, in these limited circumstances only, performance of the acts of 
reproduction and translation by or on behalf of a person having a right to use a copy of the 
program is legitimate and compatible with fair practice and must therefore be deemed not to 
require the authorization of the right-holder. An objective of this exception is to make it 
possible to connect all components of a computer system, including those of different 
manufacturers, so that they can work together. Such an exception to the author's exclusive 
rights may not be used in a way which prejudices the legitimate interests of the right-holder or 
which conflicts with a normal exploitation of the program.”78 
Article 6/3 of the same directive states: “(3) In accordance with the provisions of the 
Berne Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the provisions of this 
article may not be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a manner 
which unreasonably prejudices the right-holder’s legitimate interests or conflicts with a 
normal exploitation of the computer program.”79. 
Decompilation is another way of achieving interoperability but this is a more 
mechanic way and not only an observation method (as the black box). This method tries to 
                                                          
77 For further development see Band, Jonathan and Masanobu Katoh. “"Interfaces on Trial 2.0".” The MIT Press (2011) chapter 1. 
78 See, Directive 2009/24/EC. 
79 Ibid. 
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obtain the source code of a program through the object code, however, this mechanic way to 
obtain the source code is not very accurate and this is a way to complement the reverse 
engineering process
80
. The terms to use this method are explicit in article 6 of the Directive 
2009/24/EC. The legal terms to use the Decompilation are almost the same as the ones for 
reverse engineering (already mentioned). 
 
1.3. Interoperability and Intellectual Property (the copyright approach) 
 
As explained before, computer programs are formed by a binary code, the object code 
that than is legible by transforming it into perceivable language for humans, the source code. 
The way that was found to protect software was through copyright, which protects unique 
expressions of ideas. It is protected as a Literary Work, it protects the source code the written 
part of the program and not the real function of the program, and it does not protect the 
underlying idea
81
. 
 
1.3.1. Interfaces 
 
The Berne Convention and other international agreements have the objective to give a 
higher level of protection to software programs since they have become products of great 
relevance in our modern society. The way that was found was through copyright protection. 
Copyright was a way to solve an immediate problem, there was a need to give higher 
protection to software in order to promote the development of the same
82
. Copyright has we 
saw, does not protect the ideas, the expression and the functionality
83
 of the software
84
. 
However, it was not considered a problem since other literary works such as maps were 
protected through copyright laws and the functionality of the same were not. Copyright laws 
do have an advantage, there is an international acceptance of what should or should not be 
                                                          
80 Samuelson, Pamela and Suzanne Scotchmer. "The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering. n.d. p. 28. 
81 Samuelson, Pamela. "Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of its Protection". Texas: Texas Law Review, 
2007 p.2. 
82 See, supra note 8; p.79. 
83 Ibid. p.67. 
84 The form (the way) it is presented to us. 
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protected as copyright and the level of protection is in some way standardized across the 
world. The will to solve a first instance problem did create a second instance problem, the 
interface protection and availability as well as accessibility. 
 We already saw that software is protected by copyright and we also saw that for 
interoperability to be achieved, there needs to be granted access to the interface of the 
program. The question here, is, if the interface is also protected by copyright? The answer is 
not certain, there is a big possibility for the programmer to protect the interface through 
copyright since the interface is also made from source code and respective object code. But if 
we consider the interface as an idea and not the expression of the program, something 
tangible, the copyright laws do not cover the interface.  
A problem that rises here is the one of filling the originality test. For a work to be 
original it must come from the authors independent creation and originality
85
, the problem is 
that interfaces do have standardization requirements, this is, if we visit the ISO website
86
 we 
can perceive that interfaces are standardized
87
 and, the originality requirement can fall, 
leaving the interfaces unprotected. However, different programmers can indeed give the same 
functionality to an interface using different program writings, different source codes and 
object codes.  
Interface codes can be considered part of the software and thus, being protected by the 
same copyright laws that protect the software.  There seems to exist a dichotomy, because 
interfaces can be protected through copyright if considered part of the software but they can 
also have a lack of originality due to the standardization requirement, and if there is no 
originality they cannot be protected by copyright.  
The Berne convention does states that the written code is the one that has the ability to 
be copyrightable and it seems that being the interfaces written codes they are able to be 
copyrightable. It also seems that the interface, being part of the operating system can be 
copyrightable. Interfaces are constituted by source code, and this source code even if it’s not 
completely original, is part of an even bigger source code that is protected by copyright and 
this brings us serious problems when analysing the right to achieve interoperability. 
                                                          
85 See, supra note 8; p.61. See also, supra note 19; pp.10-15. 
86http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_ics_browse.htm?ICS1=35&ICS2=200 last seen in 02-11-2015. 
87 See, supra note 40; p. 2. 
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The EU Software Directive leaves also room for different interpretations, giving that 
the originality threshold is very low. Requiring only to be the authors’ intellectual creation. 
 
2. Software directive and the Interoperability Question 
 
To better understand what was said above we need to look at the Software directive 
(directive 2009/24/EC) and see what the legal means are, how they give protection to 
interface, and what the consequences are in competition terms. 
The software directive was created in order to solve some problems with the IT fast 
growing development. One of those problems was the interoperability and access to 
interfaces. Despite being a good legal evolution it is not enough and an ex-ante protection to 
software developers wasn’t given in the desired level, it fell short from the initial objectives. 
It left much of that desired protection to the ex-post protection (the court decisions)
88
. 
Article 1(2) of the Software directive states: “Protection in accordance with this 
Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a computer program. Ideas and 
principles which underlie any element of a computer program, including those which underlie 
its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive.” 
To ascertain if protection can be granted to interfaces, we should go back to the 
definition of interfaces and how they are divided, interfaces are composed by the interface 
specifications, the written part of the interface, and the interface implementation that is, the 
practical part of the program, the expression, and that can be protected by copyright according 
to the Software directive. However, it is not of our interest to analyze in depth the interface 
implementation since the interoperability is achieved by the interface specifications. The 
interface specification is composed by object code, a number of codes and messages that 
make the bridge and connection with other programs
89
. 
We already saw that object code is not legible for humans, it is only legible by 
machines like computers, and this brings us the question if something that is not legible by 
                                                          
88 See, supra note 19; pp. 37-39. 
89 See, supra note 70 pp. 150-154; 173. 
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humans should be protected as literary work, under the copyright laws. Article 1 (3) of the 
proposal for a directive states:  
“The algorithms which go to make up the sub-routines are not normally in themselves 
capable of receiving protection under copyright. Insofar as they are similar in nature to 
mathematical formulae, they may in exceptional circumstances attract patent protection. 
Similarly, the ideas, principles, or logic which underlies the program will not be 
copyrightable.”90 
This article taken from the proposal for the protection of computer programs can direct 
us into perceiving that the algorithms are not protected under copyright law, leaving some 
space to facilitate the interoperability and access to interfaces. However, it did give another 
way of protecting it, through patents, but, as we already saw, there is not much space to 
originality in what concerns interfaces, leaving aside the possibility of applying for a patent
91
.  
A patent is best suited to protect things that perform a function, and this is the case, the 
interface does perform a function, the function of interoperability with other programs, a 
patent also requires usefulness (not a problem) and novelty, and here is where the problem 
lies, it would be very difficult to prove the novelty of a certain interface, even if the object 
codes are different and new, the function of the interface would continue the same. 
We have in recital 11 of the Software directive that:  “For the avoidance of doubt, it 
has to be made clear that only the expression of a computer program is protected and that 
ideas and principles which underlie any element of a program, including those which underlie 
its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this directive. In accordance with this 
principle of copyright, to the extent that logic, algorithms and programming languages 
comprise ideas and principles, those ideas and principles are not protected under this 
directive. In accordance with the legislation and case-law of the Member States and the 
international copyright conventions, the expression of those ideas and principles is to be 
protected by copyright.”92 
                                                          
90 Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs, 1989; Article 1(3). 
91 See, supra note 70; p. 150. 
92 See, Directive 2009/24/EC; recital 11. 
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This seems to go in line with the Proposal for a directive, algorithms and programing 
language is not protected under the Software directive only the expression of those ideas are, 
but not the ideas itself. 
In case Navitaire v. Easyjet, we have a decision that could give us further 
understanding about this subject.  
It was brought by Navitaire an action against BulletProof and Easyjet due to alleged 
copying of computer software. Easyjet had a license for an airline reservations software 
(OpenRes) owned by Navitaire and licensed to Easyjet. Easyjet hired another company to 
create a software for airline reservations with the same functions of the program OpenRes. 
Mr. Justice Pumfrey accepted that could exist a copyright infringement if the idea was 
something very specific, but he was unwilling to consider in this case that there was an 
infringement, because there was no violation of the work per se, the labour and skill.  
Paragraph 86 writes: “I consider that the better approach is to take the view that it is 
not possible to infringe the copyright that subsists either in the source code for a parser or in 
the source code for a parser generator by observing the behaviour of the final program and 
constructing another program to do the same thing. In expressing this view, I am verging on 
drawing a distinction between the ‘idea’ of the program and its ‘expression’ (…)”93 
He also referred to an example that could better express the situation and explain it in 
simpler terms. He thought of a chef that creates a new pudding, he writes the recipe in a paper 
and thereafter he uses the same recipe to create that pudding, the recipe is in fact a literary 
work. Along comes another chef, he tastes the pudding and after much hard work and many 
attempts he creates the same pudding. Is this last chef infringing the first chef copyrights?  In 
the opinion of Mr. Justice Pumfrey; no he is not.
94
 
Mr Justice Pumfrey relied on the TRIPs agreements and WCT to explain the 
consensus on the non-protection of ideas and methods of operation
95
 
                                                          
93 Case Naviataire vs easyjet airline company; Royal Court of Justice; Para 86. 
94 See, Case Navitaire vs Easyjet; para 127. 
95 WCT art. 2 and TRIPS art. 9(2).  
 - 49 - 
 
The problem here is that there is an acceptance that the interface specification is not 
the expression but the idea, being the idea, it is not protected under the directive and 
subsequently is not copyrightable. 
If there was a consideration in the opposite way, this is, if the interface specification 
would be considered expression and not the idea, we would have to fill the criteria of 
originality, looking at article 1(3) of the Software directive: 
“A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the 
author's own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to determine its eligibility 
for protection.” 
This article gives a required level of originality very low, it only requires being the 
authors own intellectual creation and it removes any other criterion to ascertain if originality 
is or is not present in the creation. 
 
2.1. Methods to Gain Access to Interfaces 
 
Through the analysis of the Software directive we can perceive that for interoperability 
purposes some solutions were created, despite being few and not very effective. What it was 
intended was to create a balance between the owners and the competitors. Recital 15 states: 
“Circumstances may exist when such a reproduction of the code and translation of its 
form are indispensable to obtain the necessary information to achieve the interoperability of 
an independently created program with other programs. It has therefore to be considered that, 
in these limited circumstances only, performance of the acts of reproduction and translation 
by or on behalf of a person having a right to use a copy of the program is legitimate and 
compatible with fair practice and must therefore be deemed not to require the authorization of 
the right-holder. An objective of this exception is to make it possible to connect all 
components of a computer system, including those of different manufacturers, so that they 
can work together.”96 
                                                          
96 See, supra note; 16. 
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We can perceive that there was a concern to provide a solution for interoperability 
between different software’s even if they originate from competitors and different 
manufacturers. 
The directive provides, according to article 5(1), 5(3) and 6 the possibility of reverse 
engineering. 
We already saw that there are two types of reverse engineering, that complement each 
other, the first one is the black box
97
 method that consists in analyzing from the outside what 
the program does but not knowing how it does it
98
. The second method, decompilation
99
, is a 
more intrusive and mechanical process that tries to obtain the source code through the object 
code provided with the software
100
 
Article 5(1) and (3) provides the legitimacy to engage in the first method of reverse 
engineering, the black box process.  Article 5(3) states: “The person having a right to use a 
copy of a computer program shall be entitled, without the authorization of the right-holder, to 
observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and 
principles which underlie any element of the program if he does so while performing any of 
the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program which he is 
entitled to do.” 
We can see that there is a legitimacy to observe study and test the software to gain 
knowledge on how the program works; we already saw that the ideas underlying the software 
are not protected by copyright, only the written part. It is not surprising that it would be 
permitted to analyze a certain computer program in order to perceive the functionality of the 
same.  
However, interoperability is hardly achieved by the black box method; decompilation 
is a complementary part of the reverse engineering process. Decompilation
101
 is also covered 
in the Software Directive, more precisely in article 6, and this process does have more 
restraints. 
                                                          
97 For further development see, Directive 2009/24/EC; pp. 56-59. 
98 See, supra note 62; p.159. 
99 Ibid. p.161. 
100 For further development see, supra note 19; pp. 23-31. 
101 See, supra note 40; p.4. 
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Decompilation has we saw is a mechanical method that tries to obtain the source code 
through the provided object code (illegible for humans). To engage in decompilation there is a 
need to reproduce the program and make copies, and indeed, when trying to achieve 
interoperability, the reproduction of a computer program is allowed by article 4 of the 
directive. 
When decompilation is done and the desired results are achieved, we can expose 
Know-how that was used to create the software
102
, and this know-how many times has more 
economic and technological relevance than the original expression of the program
103
 and this 
is why article 6 of the directive makes some exceptions and imposes limits in the 
decompilation method
104
. First of all, article 6(1) (c) states: “those acts are confined to the 
parts of the original program which are necessary in order to achieve interoperability.” 
There is here a limitation only to proceed with the decompilation within the strictly necessary 
to achieve interoperability.  
In second place, article 6(2) states: “The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit 
the information obtained through its application: (a) to be used for goals other than to 
achieve the interoperability of the independently created computer program.” There is a 
reinforcement of the idea to protect the right-holder`s rights
105
.  
The use of information obtained through decompilation cannot be used for other 
purposes other than to achieve interoperability
106
, this means that Know-how acquired during 
the decompilation of the object code to source code cannot be used; however, this seems 
somehow unrealistic. After acquiring knowledge of something it is practically impossible to 
remove the knowledge from the person mind
107
.  
Article 6 (3) of the Software directive ensures that decompilation exceptions shall not 
be “used in a manner which unreasonably affects the right-holders legitimate interests or 
conflicts with a normal exploitation of the computer program”. This article was introduced to 
                                                          
102 Ibid. p.3. 
103 See, supra note 52; p. 83. 
104 See, supra note 3; p.29. 
105 See, supra note 62; p.161. 
106 “Volume 20.” Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal (1994), pp. 335-337. 
107 For further development see, supra note 19; p. 51. 
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ensure the compliance of the European directive with the Berne convention and the three-step 
test
108
.  
The three-step test of Berne convention applies three cumulative sets for granting an 
exception for the reproduction rights: In certain special cases; provided that they do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work; provided that they do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the authors
109
. 
It seems that the objective here is to pressure the right-holder and the competitor to 
engage in licensing agreements. On one hand we have the possibility of the competitor to gain 
access to more than interoperability, to gain access to the business secret, to valuable Know-
how, and one the other hand we have the costs and time consuming process of reverse 
engineering and its delimitations.  
It would be more favourable for the right-holder to impose a date on which he would 
disclose the interoperability information, let us say, in one year and it would be more 
favourable for the competitor to wait that year of standby if the time required for all processes 
of reverse engineering would consist for example in two years.  
In what concerns the costs associated with this commercial transaction, it could be 
favourable for both parties, in one hand we have the right-holder that gains time advantage 
(one year with no competition) as well as the revenue from the licensing agreement and on the 
other hand we have the competitor that doesn’t have to spend money in the reverse 
engineering process and only has to pay the costs associated with the licensing agreement. 
Something that was not taken into account when formulating the Software directive 
was the balancing of interests between the right-holder and competitor. In a first instance, we 
don’t have any legitimate way of obliging a right-holder to disclose interoperability 
information, articles 5 and 6 of the Software directive are only a legal way of trying to 
achieve interoperability, however, even if engaging into the reverse engineering process, there 
is no certainty of achieving interoperability with the decompiled software.  
Another aspect is the fact that technology evolves every day, and decompilation 
processes depend on mechanical processes, these mechanical processes will eventually 
                                                          
108 Article 9 (2) Berne Convention. 
109 Article 9 (1) and (2) Berne Convention. See also, supra note 19; p. 41. 
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evolve, making the decompilation process faster and cheaper. If the decompilation process 
becomes so cheap that is not worth engaging into commercial negotiations with the right-
holder, the right-holder will be in a disadvantageous situation, not benefiting from the time 
advantage (where the right-holder has the monopoly of the technology) and not gaining 
anything from the licensing agreements.  
Other problem can rise, with the decompilation processes evolution, generating a 
problem of Know-how discloser that is embedded in the source code. One way those right-
holders may have to overcome this disclosure may be through article 6(1) (b) of the Software 
directive that states: “the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously 
been readily available”. This tells us that if the information is readily available for the 
competitor to achieve interoperability, the competitor cannot engage in the process of 
decompilation
110
. Other problem appears when analyzing this sentence, and that is to know 
what is the amount of readily available information that needs to exist in order to prevent the 
decompilation process. The Directive does not explicitly states, leaving this problem to be 
solved in an ex-post situation. 
It needs also to be said that article 6 (2) (b) of the Software directive prohibits 
competitors from coming together in order to support the cost with the reverse engineering 
process. This limits the process of reverse engineering to the richest companies, to the 
companies with funds available to invest in this process. (“Shall not permit the information 
obtained through its application: (b) to be given to others
111
). This let us perceive that small 
and medium companies of this field can eventually be forever set aside from the competition 
process. The directive, in practice does not provide access to interoperability information to 
small and medium companies.  
Companies that rely on interoperability to continue their business do not have any cost 
effective solution, this is, either they try to reverse engineer the program (something very 
costly and uncertain), or they try the ex-post solution, the courts solution, a solution that is 
also very damaging in terms of time and money.  
Other problem that is also unaddressed by the directive is the possibility of the right-
holder`s to change the interface specifications at any time, if a company wants to decompile 
                                                          
110 See, supra note 19; p.62.  
111 See, Directive 2009/24/EC. 
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the program spending time and money in the process, they should have at least a legal 
certainty to use the decompiled information’s in the future, this leaves great uncertainty for 
the decompilation process. If a company successfully decompiles a program it could be 
required to do it again for the same program engaging in new costs for the exact program
112
. 
 
2.1.1. Economic perspective of Reverse Engineering 
 
The primary reason to enter into a reverse engineering process is to create a competing 
product or to achieve interoperability with a certain program. Reverse engineering is a time-
consuming process and also very costly. If an application developer wants to make a product 
to run for example on the Windows operating system it must have access to the APIs. Some 
of the software developers publish the interfaces in a public way, others license them and 
others will maintain the interface information’s as trade secrets113. 
Keeping the interfaces as a secret can give the software owners control over the 
applications, in this case, making an non-interoperable program it can go both ways, if 
consumers and applications developers do not find the software attractive, it can mean high 
losses, however, if the software turns out to be attractive it could lead to a snow-ball effect 
where the increasing network effects turns the software and the interface into a de facto 
program in the market.  
Reverse engineering came to menace the strategy of non-interoperable software 
developers since they do not need the authorization or license contracts from the software 
owner. The idea of turning the reverse engineering process lawful seems the one to give 
software developers higher incentives to license the access to interfaces, this is because if 
software developers do not license and the applications developers reverse engineer the 
program they will not gain any income
114
 and in the other way, if they do license, the program 
developers taking into account the time consuming and costly process that is to reverse 
engineer a program will be more prone to accept the license agreement.  
                                                          
112 See, supra note 76; p. 36. 
113 Ibid. p. 34 
114 Because there was no license agreement. 
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In the software industry the power comes from network effects, this means that the 
more applications are available to a certain software more users it will attract, and when a 
software has a high amount of users, it will attract more applications developers.  
Non-interoperability and incompatibility between two software developers may lead to 
higher competition between them and in a short term it will be positive for consumers, leading 
to better prices but in a long term it could give a monopoly to the winner and consequently 
increase in prices to make up for the stage were the competition between the software 
developers was fierce
115
. A legal balanced rule on reverse engineering can give economic 
benefits for users, software developers and program developers. 
 
3. Interoperability under scrutiny of Competition Law 
 
The intervention of competition law in matters of IP is restricted to some exceptional 
cases. Competition and IP laws do have the same objectives; both of them want to enhance 
market efficiency, both want to increase dynamic efficiency (innovation) and static efficiency 
(price competition)
116
.  
Like the name suggests, competition law deals with the competitive process between 
companies, this area has the objective to regulate, prevent and judge the competitive 
processes in order to raise consumer welfare.  
When analyzing articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU we can perceive that there is a clash 
in what concerns the openness of interoperability information’s to other enterprises. For 
example, article 102 (b) of the TFEU states: “Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (b) 
limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers”117. If a 
company does not disclose its interoperability information’s to another company with a new 
and innovative technology we could argue that the first company is limiting the market and 
technical development and it prejudices consumers. When a company owns dominant 
software on a horizontal market and does not discloses interoperability information’s, it could 
                                                          
115 See, supra note 76; p. 40. 
116 Drextel, Joseph and Annete Kur. "Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law". Edwaard Elgar , n.d, p. 326. 
117 Article 102 TFEU. 
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be closing secondary, vertical markets
118
. Sometimes, new technologies appear with the 
intention of competing in a vertical market, but for that, they need to gain access to 
interoperability information’s. 
When talking about competition law and IP laws, there is a common ground that is the 
enhance of consumer welfare and market efficiency, however, there is some predisposition on 
IP laws to constrain the static efficiency due to the ability of a right-holder to increase the 
prices of a certain product of which he has the monopoly. IP laws, constrain static efficiency 
but increase dynamic efficiency on promoting the innovation, this because, there is a 
protection given ex-ante that secures the economic returns of the research and development 
made to develop the product. The opposite happens in competition law, where there is a 
predisposition to increase the static efficiency (the competition between companies in terms 
of product prices. Where there is more price competition lower prices will appear)
119
. 
There needs to be said that competition law does not forbids monopoly, if a company 
is superior than other companies they should not be penalized for winning the race to the top 
and for being the best. Competition law prohibits the abuse of a dominant position
120
. Also, IP 
laws do not give market monopoly, they only give a temporary monopoly of a certain product 
in order to recoup investments made, if we think in the software industry, we can perceive 
that there is not a monopoly but instead hard competition
121
. 
 
3.1. Should competition law deal with interface openness?  
 
As we saw, IP provides certainty in an ex-ante situation, giving the investors an 
opportunity to recoup the investments made, giving them security when investing. 
Competition law provides an ex-post analysis, it corrects market failures and abuses of law by 
                                                          
118 See, supra note 37; pp. 104-106. 
119 Piedrahita, Carlos Andrés Uribe and Fernando Carbajo Cascón. “"Regulacíon «Ex Ante» y Control «Ex Post»: La Dificil Relacion entre 
Propiedad Intelectual y Derecho de la Competencia.” Actas de derecho industrial y derecho de autor n.d. pp. 308 and 309. 
120 Pranvera, Kellezi. "Abuse below the Threshold of Dominance? Market Power, Market Dominance, and Abuse of Economic Dependence". 
University of Geneva, 2007, pp. 71-84. See also Korah, Valentine. Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules". Hart 
Publishing, 2006. pp. 133-136. 
121 Case T-69/89, Magill para. 46. 
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analyzing, in a case-by-case basis, the situations that lead to an abuse of a dominant position, 
and it corrects the imperfections of the market.  
Competition law takes the certainty that IP gives, however, when analyzing the 
concrete situations, competition law does gives an approach to the problems with a higher 
certainty than the ex-ante legislation, it takes into account the details of the case, the economic 
and legislative problems and the solution is of higher reliability. When we involve the courts 
to solve the problems of market efficiency we can expect a reliable decision. In the process 
different specialists from several areas are always involved, from the area of competition law, 
of intellectual property, economy, programmers, technology experts, etc. 
Another issue associated with an ex-ante protection is the lobby
122
 that goes hand-to-
hand with legislators. The pressure to take a path when legislating is immense and big 
companies do enter into this kind of pressure with legislators. Legislators most of the times do 
not have any kind of background in technology and when legislating they do not have into 
account the dynamic and ever changing market of technology. 
Competition law interference does not have only good things; it has some negative 
aspects. When using an ex-post assessment we are interfering in the legal protection of IP, we 
are taking away part of the investors’ confidence in the legal certainty, we are decreasing 
dynamic efficiency, we are interfering with a balance that was previously made, and we are 
decreasing dynamic efficiency to increase static efficiency. But the ultimate goal of both IP 
laws and competition laws is to increase innovation and consumer welfare. When decreasing 
innovation we are in a previous step, decreasing market efficiency and consequently, 
consumer welfare. The competition authorities must have limited influence when dealing with 
IP rights, and the intrusion must be minimum. On the other hand we also have inflexible IP 
laws that can decrease static efficiency, giving more weight to one of the balance plates, 
consequently creating instability on the thin balance between dynamic and static efficiency.  
Furthermore, highly restrictive ex-post control will create barriers to investment and 
innovation; it could disrupt the market when creating distrust in the legal protection pre-
conceived. We can perceive that there is a dichotomy when talking about the desirable level 
of protection given to IP through Competition law. There is not a clash on the objectives that 
                                                          
122 For further development see Coen, David. “"The European Business Lobby".” Business Strategy Review (1997). 
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both IP and Competition pursue but instead, a tension on the level of the protection that 
should be given. 
We already saw that interfaces that provide interoperability are protected by copyright 
law, copyright law is indeed a IP right given in an ex-ante situation, however, we also saw 
that secondary markets and vertical competition can be closed by the dominant firms who 
own these rights, this can be perceived as an abuse of law. If a secondary market is closed by 
a right that was initially meant to prevent horizontal competition disruptions, we can 
comprehend that IP objectives are being disrespected. Innovation is being constricted by the 
same rights that aim on protecting innovation initiatives.  
Faulty IP rights do exist given the complexity of the volatile technological market and 
in those cases there should exist a way to correct them, and here is where competition law 
should intervene
123
. [La posición doctrinal mayoritaria considera que la relación entre 
estructura de Mercado e innovación tiene una forma de “U invertida”, significando que los 
dos extremos (competencia perfecta y monopolio) son los puntos donde se produce una 
menor innovación]
124
. 
When there is an exclusion from third parties due to IP rights, it can eventually open a 
door to competition authorities’ intervention. The historical perspective was that the IP rights 
were in higher ground of protection. In the past, when a tension existed between IP and 
competition, it was the IP rights that prevailed because of the recognition of a previous right 
that was given to the right-holder
125
. As can be seen, nowadays, things are not as conservative 
as they were, nowadays; an economic analysis is required, especially when there is a 
foreclosure of a downstream market
126
. 
An example that an ex-ante protection is important and should be (in the plausible 
limit) left alone or with little intervention, are the mergers and acquisitions that competition 
law deals with. When understanding if a merger is going to be detrimental or beneficial to 
competition, competition authorities are going to assess in a previous stage if the merger can 
                                                          
123 For further development see, supra note 113; pp. 315 to 318 
124 Ibid. p. 318. 
125 This recognition of primacy to IP law was highly defended in the US courts as can be seen in the cases, E Bement & Sons v National 
Harrow Co., 186 US 70, 91 (1902) and Richard S. Simpson, Petitioner, V. United Oil Company of California, 377 U.S. 13. 310, (1964). 
126 Report by the EAGCP, “An economic Approach to article 82”, July 2005, pp. 26, 27 and 28. 
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or cannot happen and if accepted, the merger cannot than be reversed. In order to get these 
decisions, competition authorities make an economic analysis on the case. 
 
3.1.1. European Union Lobbying 
  
Lobbying nowadays is a normal way of doing politics and sometimes also welcomed. 
In the European Union system it all began with the increasing legislative power transfer from 
the member countries to “Brussels”. In a first instance, industries were lobbying through the 
industry Federations
127
 but soon the companies realized that the process was doomed to be 
slow and lost its credibility. It was then that companies started to make direct lobbying and 
the Commission welcomed this increasingly movement of lobbying, the Commission was 
overwhelmed by the legislative functions that it possessed (between 1985 and 1993) and the 
companies provided the technical expertise from the different areas of interest. 
As the legislative process started to decline and the legislative efforts were no longer 
overwhelming the Commission felt an overload of lobbyist and it was then that was created 
the industrial forums
128
 where companies of a certain specific area gather and discuss the 
legislative process emitting opinions. 
 This gives us an understanding on how the ex-ante legislation on software was 
introduced, lobby is part of modern politics and it is many times influenced by the companies’ 
experts that always go in accordance with the companies interests. We do not say that the 
legislative process is made by the companies only that it is sometimes influenced by the 
highly skilled experts on certain technical matters. 
 
3.2. Essential facilities doctrine 
 
Before moving on to the analysis of case law, there needs to be made a small study of 
the essential facilities doctrine and how it is used in the EU. 
                                                          
127 See, supra note 116; p. 18. 
128 Ibid. pp. 19-20. 
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The essential facilities doctrine is the main method to force a company to share its 
interface information
129
. In terms of competition law, there are two main actions that can be 
sanctioned, the first one is the formation of cartels or agreements between competitors that 
distort the competition process, and these agreements are foreseen in article 101 TFEU. 
The second one is the exclusion of competitors through the abuse of dominance
130
, 
dominance per se is not forbidden, and a company can become dominant through its better 
products or prices. This abuse of dominance
131
 is foreseen in article 102 TFEU and is the 
most relevant for the analysis of the doctrine in question. Article 102 TFEU does provide a 
list of what is considered an abuse of dominance
132
, however, the list is not extensive and it 
leaves the courts room for a wide interpretation. In the European Union, companies are 
allowed to choose with whom they do business and make contracts as well as the terms in 
which they contract, yet, there are exceptional circumstances that can be invoked to obligate a 
company to contract, for example: when a facility is essential to compete in a vertical market.  
This doctrine was first applied and developed to physical and tangible 
infrastructures
133
. Due to the lack of rigidity in interpretation of article 102 TFEU the 
essential facilities doctrine was many times invoked in cases of horizontal competition, in IP 
matters and nowadays it is also presented as an argument in technological matters. The 
problem here would be the balance of the incentives to innovation and the competition 
effects. 
The obligation to grant access to the facilities may well act as a disincentive formula 
as far as innovation concerns. Companies usually invest in development of their facilities in 
order to keep or gain competitive advantage. When a company is forced to give access to 
those facilities it loses the investment made as well as the competitive advantage.  
Companies may be reluctant to innovate when observing the normal application of the 
essential facilities doctrine and the lack of certainty and predictability of this doctrine
134
. The 
essential facilities doctrine should be applied only in exceptional circumstances and 
                                                          
129 See, supra note 19; pp. 178. See also Microsoft v Commission case T-201/4. 
130 Korah, Valentine. Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules". Hart Publishing, 2006.” pp. 133-136. 
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132 Article 102 TFEU. 
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 - 61 - 
 
interpreted “cum grano salis”, this means, that it should be applied with good sense taking 
into consideration the possibility of causing damages. 
When talking specifically of the obligation to disclose the interface information, the 
subject is even more delicate because we are entering in the field of IP. IP is a protection 
given in an ex-ante stage and it protects the IP owners from a possible free-rider on their 
effort and investment at the same time granting predictability and security.  
The indispensability threshold to provide access to IP rights must be higher than the 
threshold to grant access to physical facilities. The difference between these two situations is 
the one that in physical facilities, when granting access, the right to the facility and the 
economic investment is not lost, the right-holder is still the owner of the facility, and the 
facility is not lost to the competitor to whom the access was granted.  
In the case of mandatory access granted in the field of IP everything changes, the very 
essence of IP rights is the fact that the right-holder can benefit from the temporary monopoly 
granted ex-ante to retrieve profits from the product
135
. When other competitor wants to use 
the IP right in its advantage, the monopoly is lost; the “facility” is now in the sphere of the 
right-holder and its competitors.  
The application of article 102 TFEU to these situations seems to be a patch used to 
correct ineffective ex-ante rights. Article 102 TFEU is used in situations of abuse of a 
dominant position; however, what the dominant companies are in fact doing is nothing more 
than the application of rights given by governments in matters of IP. An illustrative case to 
understand these situations is the Volvo case.  
The Volvo case was about the delimitation of spare parts design and subsequently 
impossibility of other companies producing spare parts for Volvo cars, what happened after 
the Volvo judgement was the reformulation of ineffective ex-ante rights
136
. This situation 
provides us information’s on how to solve problems of interface information’s and what 
access should be granted to competitors. The reformulation of IP rights that protect interface 
information by using this method rather than the application of article 102 TFEU, would 
secure the predictability, competition efficiency and innovation 
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Another matter that can raise some issues of unpredictability is the Regulation 1/2003 
and the power given to the Commission to apply fines and remedies.  
Recital 12 states: “This Regulation should make explicit provision for the 
Commission's power to impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural, which is 
necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end, having regard to the principle of 
proportionality. Structural remedies should only be imposed either where there is no equally 
effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be 
more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to the 
structure of an undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be 
proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that 
derives from the very structure of the undertaking.”137 
The problem of giving this power to the Commission is that there is no prior 
experience in these subjects. The Commission has to determine the amount of information 
that should be disclosed, the value of the fines that have to be paid (by the abusive company) 
and this brings great uncertainty to right-holders. It seems that the easiest way to prevent this 
situation is through private agreements, negotiations or reformulating ex-ante regulations.  
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1. Case Law approach  
 
It should be noted that the cases presented were chosen because of its great relevance 
and importance on the EU jurisprudence. 
To understand the line of thought that is taken within the European Union and what 
happens in real life, there needs to be made an analysis of case law and how decisions were 
made as well as the criteria used to reach those decisions. 
Competition intervention as already seen needs to work as a safety net, to correct some 
imperfections that rise with faulty IP laws. An IPR alone does not confer monopoly or market 
power. An economic analysis of the static and dynamic efficiency needs to be made in order 
to perceive what the economic consequences are when messing up with ex-ante rights. 
Article 102 TFEU does not prevent market power; it only prohibits abuses of 
dominant positions. What is considered an abuse was left to the competent authorities to 
decide. Since 1974 with the Commercial Solvents case this subject has been scrutinized.  
In the technological field interoperability is a main characteristic needed to compete 
viably in the market. Non-interoperable programs could be excluded from the market, and to 
achieve interoperability there has to be access to interface specifications. 
Usually for a firm to compete viably in the market there is not any obligation for 
competitors to provide access to their interfaces, as it was explained in Bronner
138
 case. 
Bronner wanted access to Mediaprint`s distribution system of newspapers, and the decision 
was not favourable to Bronner, forcing the company to create distribution facilities of their 
own, this because there was no real impediment to the creation of such facilities nor it was 
economically unreasonable
139
.  
In the technological area the situation differs, because it is a market of high network 
effects, this means that if the market tips in favour of a company’s product, it will be very 
difficult to access downstream markets without interoperability information. 
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 - 65 - 
 
Dominant companies to prevent disclosing interoperability information claim that 
when there are more components interoperating with the software the more vulnerable it stays 
to virus and cyber-attacks, it is a security hazard. 
 
1.1. Volvo/Veng Case 
 
The first case that dealt with “refusal to supply” topic was the Volvo/Veng case. In this 
case, the proprietor of a registered design (Volvo) refused to grant a license to Veng for the 
import and sale of body panels of Volvo vehicles, and Veng perceived this as an abuse of 
dominant position.  Veng imported car parts to be used as substitutes in Volvos vehicles, those 
being manufactured without permission of Volvo
140
. 
Accordingly to paragraph 9:  
“It must however be noted that the exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor of a 
registered design in respect of car body panels may be prohibited by Article 86 if it involves, 
on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position, certain abusive conduct such as the 
arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare 
parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a particular model 
even though many cars of that model are still in circulation, provided that such conduct is 
liable to affect trade between Member States”141. 
From this excerpt we can perceive that a refusal to license
142
 may be prohibited by 
article 86 (now article 102 TFEU), if particular factors are present in the equation. The 
company that retains the IP right does have the power to prohibit reproductions and to not 
give licenses to other companies to sell the item; however, the monopoly does not extend to 
the secondary markets. When dealing with obligations to grant access to ex-ante rights of IP 
we need to think that we are depriving the right-holder from the exclusivity of his rights, the 
exclusivity of making money from the product developed by him
143
. 
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These decisions on when is it or is it not mandatory to grant access to IP facilities is a 
controversy subject and very unclear to right-holders that did not have any kind of guidance 
in this matters, it was because of that, that the European Commission emitted the Guidance 
paper on the enforcement of article 82 (now article 102 TFEU) to abusive exclusionary 
behaviours
144
, however, the guidelines did not brought any advances on the understanding of 
the exclusionary conducts, in fact, they only brought even more confusion. 
 
1.2. Magill Case 
 
Some years later the courts were faced with another case of compulsory licensing, the 
Magill Case
145
, this case took action in the Republic of Ireland, where there were three 
weekly TV guides in circulation, those TV guides were all related to the different channels.  
There were three TV channels with three different TV guides, and all of the TV 
channels did provide the daily programming to the different newspapers for free, but the 
weekly programming was left exclusive for each TV guides. TV enthusiasts had to buy three 
guides to program their favourite shows. Magill had the idea to compile the three different TV 
guides into one TV guide. As to be expected, TV broadcasters in joint litigation took to Irish 
courts a complaint on the disrespect of copyrights
146
.  
Magill, presented a complaint in the Commission, claiming that the attitude of the TV 
broadcasters was violating article 86 of the EEC treaty. The commission did consider the 
Magill pretensions correct and decided in its favour, considering that the TV broadcasters 
were abusing their dominant position in a secondary market
147
, the Commission obliged the 
TV broadcasters to license (in return of a royalty) the programs guides. The Court of First 
Instance (now General Court) decided in favour of the Commission: 
Paragraph 73 states: “Conduct of that type-characterized by preventing the production 
and marketing of a new product, for which there is potential consumer demand, on the 
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ancillary market of television magazines and thereby excluding all competition from that 
market solely in order to secure the applicants monopoly – clearly goes beyond what is 
necessary to fulfil the essential function of the copyright as permitted in Community law. The 
applicants refusal to authorize third parties to publish its weekly listings was, in this case, 
arbitrary in so far as it was not justified either by the specific needs of the broadcasting sector, 
with which the present case is not concerned, or by those peculiar to the activity of publishing 
television magazines. It was thus possible for the applicant to adapt to the conditions of a 
television magazine market which was open to competition in order to ensure the commercial 
viability of its weekly publication, the RTE Guide. The applicants conduct cannot, therefore, 
be covered in Community law by the protection conferred by its copyright in the programme 
listings
148”. 
It is good to observe the essential facilities function and its application on subjects not 
related to the technological market. The essential facility doctrine was developed in cases 
where there was a refusal to deal. It has its origins in the United States judicial system, but it 
was adopted by many countries around the world (in Europe, Australia, South Africa). 
Basically, this doctrine deals with situations in which a monopolist company that owns an 
indispensable facility for other competitors refuses to grant access or to deal with those other 
companies in need.  
In the United States legal claiming there needs to be made proof of certain aspects: 
control of the essential facility by the monopolist; the competitor’s inability to reproduce the 
facility; that the monopolist company has denied use of the facility to the competitor and that 
providing the facility to competitors is feasible. 
It is very hard for a company to prove that it is completely indispensable to use a 
certain facility to enter into the desired market, besides that, it has to prove that it would be 
impossible or nearly impossible to reasonably reproduce the facility, also, it has to prove that 
the use of the facility will not affect the capability of the right-holder to continue its business 
and serve its customers
149
. 
This could better be illustrated through an example: in the railroad business, if 
someone owns the infrastructure of the railroad (the rails), and a company that produces coal 
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wants to use the rails, to transport it, it would be disproportional to construct the entire 
network of rails, it would be necessary to invest millions to construct a new railroad
150
. 
The question here is if the essential facilities criteria, normally used with questions of 
physical infrastructures could be employed in matters of IP, of non-physical infrastructures. 
The Court of Justice in the Magill case gave an answer and created certain criteria’s to 
ascertain whether or not there are exceptional circumstances and consequently obligation to 
provide access. The conditions are: 
1) the refusal to license must concern a product or service that is indispensable for 
carrying on a business
151
; 
2) the refusal prevented the appearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly 
guide to television programs, which the television companies in question did not offer and for 
which there was a potential consumer demand. (Such refusal constitutes an abuse under 
article 86 of the Treaty)
152
; 
3) there must exist a justification for the refusal
153
;  
4) the refusal reserved a secondary market, by excluding all competition on that 
market
154
. 
There is no proof that the essential facilities doctrine was used in the Magill case, 
however, we can ascertain that there are some similarities with the same. The difference of 
applying the essential facilities doctrine to non-physical assets is: when obliging a right-
holder for example of a rail road to grant access, the right-holder will continue to own the 
rails and in the IP case the same doesn’t happen, when access is granted to the IP right, the IP 
right-holder will not have the same ability to make profits from it. In this case, through the 
compulsory licence competition and innovation were enhanced.  
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1.3. IMS Case 
 
Another relevant case is the IMS
155
 case. IMS was the leading company on gathering 
and supplying data on deliveries to pharmacies by wholesalers of pharmaceuticals. The 
effectiveness of pharmaceutical companies in its promotional affairs was measured by this 
data. IMS divided the German market into one thousand eight hundred and sixty geographic 
zones that were based in the postal codes.  
This format developed by IMS in association with its customers had become the de 
facto format, and this format took into account deliveries, prices, volumes, location of 
bridges, hospitals, pharmacies and doctors clinics. NDC a direct competitor of IMS appeared 
in the market and wanted to provide sales data (independently obtained) in the same format as 
IMS (using the same geographic divisions). IMS relied on copyright to prevent NDC from 
using the same geographic format. It is also of importance to state that all costumers discarded 
the use of other geographic division.  
NDC challenged the IMS copyrights stating that it would be impossible to enter in this 
market without using the IMS geographic divisions of Germany, although NDC did not 
brought any new product; they stated that the delivery method and how it would obtain the 
market information was innovative and technologically different
156
. Unlike the Magill case, 
there is no new product and no foreclosure of a secondary market.  
According to a request of a German court (where the case was pending) the Court of 
Justice gave a preliminary ruling. The court, making a reference to the Magill and Bronner 
cases decided and considered that a refusal to license could be considered to be abusive if four 
conditions are met
157
: 
1) the protected product is indispensable for carrying on a business; 
2) the refusal is such as to exclude any competition on the secondary market;  
3) the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential 
consumer demand; 
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4) the refusal is not justified by any “objective considerations”158. 
An important consideration to the analysis of these criteria is that, according to the 
Advocate General (Poiares Maduro) these conditions are cumulative
159
. Now we could ask 
what is considered indispensable for carrying a business. We need to perceive that a product 
can be helpful in starting a business and entering into a market but without necessarily being 
indispensable. Fortunately some considerations have been given in this regard. 
Paragraph 28 states: “It is clear from paragraphs 43 and 44 of Bronner that, in order to 
determine whether a product or service is indispensable for enabling an undertaking to carry 
on business in a particular market, it must be determined whether there are products or 
services which constitute alternative solutions, even if they are less advantageous, and 
whether there are technical, legal or economic obstacles capable of making it impossible or at 
least unreasonably difficult for any undertaking seeking to operate in the market to create, 
possibly in cooperation with other operators, the alternative products or services. According 
to paragraph 46 of Bronner, in order to accept the existence of economic obstacles, it must be 
established, at the very least, that the creation of those products or services is not 
economically viable for production on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking which 
controls the existing product or service.”160 
So, the criterion of indispensability is not applied if there are viable solutions. In this 
case, the national courts were left to decide whether the conditions were applicable to the 
situation and to the facts. 
Paragraph 49 states: “ Therefore, the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position 
to allow access to a product protected by an intellectual property right, where that product is 
indispensable for operating on a secondary market, may be regarded as abusive only where 
the undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself essentially to 
duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the 
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intellectual property right, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the 
owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand
161” 
 Paragraph 50 states: “It is for the national court to determine whether such is the case 
in the dispute in the main proceedings.
162” 
Now, one may argue that the refusal to use only the structure of the geographical 
division owned by IMS is an abusive behaviour, and once again, the Court of Justice only 
made an analysis to the abstract principles and not to the facts (that were left to the national 
court). 
Paragraph 52 states: “(...)that the refusal by an undertaking which holds a dominant 
position and owns an intellectual property right in a brick structure indispensable to the 
presentation of regional sales data on pharmaceutical products in a Member State to grant a 
licence to use that structure to another undertaking which also wishes to provide such data in 
the same Member State, constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 82 EC where the following conditions are fulfilled:  
— the undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer, on the market for the 
supply of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner of the 
intellectual property right and for which there is a potential  
— the refusal is not justified by objective considerations;  
— the refusal is such as to reserve to the owner of the intellectual property right the 
market for the supply of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member State 
concerned by eliminating all competition on that market.
163” 
We can perceive that the legal foundation for the refusal to supply was restrained, the 
criteria that was used in the IMS case is more restrictive than that used in the Magill case. 
This case is of great relevance because only some weeks before IMS judgement, a decision 
was taken in the Microsoft
164
 case by the Commission. 
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1.4. Microsoft Case 
 
In 1998 Sun Microsystems (a provider of server hardware and software) requested 
Microsoft to provide the interoperability information necessary to develop their own 
technology that was intended to perform the work-group functions, this is, to link a family of 
computers, for example in a company. This operating system intended to facilitate the use of 
printers or authentication of users. In second place, Microsoft was accused of integrating the 
windows media player when selling the Windows PC operating system, it was an automatic 
purchase, and there was no form of rejecting or opting not to acquire the windows media 
player.  
We need to have into account that the media player market is a different market from 
the operating system one. Microsoft being the market leader in what concerns operating 
systems took advantage of that to provide a different product (a media player). 
Microsoft was at the time developing a new function of its operating systems, the 
technology that was being developed was called Active Directory, this technology was 
revolutionary at the time, it provided Windows users the ability to have the same user 
experience in any computer around the world, access confidential documents and other 
services. It provided the company administrators the ability to provide to all company 
computers general policies; to install programs in all the computers and apply updates. 
Sun Microsystems requested the interoperability information so that its work group 
server could access this new technology, without this access it was very likely that they would 
lose many clients
165
.  
The commission found that Microsoft by refusing to provide the requested information 
was in fact abusing its dominant position. It was taking its advantage in the PC operating 
system as leverage in another market. Microsoft owned a program for work-group functions 
and the interoperability information necessary to access the Active Directory function. 
Microsoft argued that Sun had the access to interoperability information and how to 
achieve it. It was all explained in Microsoft`s website. It was said that many server operating 
systems did in fact interoperate with Windows operating system; furthermore, the problems 
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with interoperability could be fixed by using add-ons, reverse engineering or 
decompilation
166
.  
Sun did in fact have access to that basic interoperability information. However, what 
was intended was not a basic interoperability access but instead a native level of 
interoperability. The Commission perceived that interoperability was a question of degree
167
, 
what Microsoft provided was basic information to interoperate, something that was not 
enough to the case in appreciation. 
Paragraph 139 states: “The Commission also recognises that there is a whole range of 
possible degrees of interoperability between PCs running Windows and work group server 
operating systems and that some interoperability' with the Windows domain architecture is 
already possible. It did not fix a priori a given level of interoperability which is indispensable 
to the maintenance of effective competition on the market but, following its investigation, it 
established that the degree of interoperability that competitors could achieve using the 
available methods was too low to enable them to remain viably on the market.”168 
The Commission emitted the rulings only weeks after the Court of Justice rulings on 
the IMS case and the approach taken in each case was substantially different. The refusal to 
supply was the main point in discussion in both cases but the methods to perceive if there is 
an infringement in a refusal to supply were disparate. 
The Commission argued that the IMS criteria should not be applicable in this case due 
to fundamental differences of the cases and different assessment under article 102 TFEU.  
Paragraph 168 writes: “The Commission, on the other hand, contends that an 
automatic' application of the criteria laid down in IMS Health, cited in paragraph 107 above, 
would be 'problematic' in this case. It maintains that, in order to determine whether such a 
refusal is abusive, it must take into consideration all the particular circumstances surrounding 
that refusal, which need not necessarily be the same as those identified in Magill and IMS 
Health, cited in paragraph 107 above. Thus it explains at recital 558 to the contested decision, 
that '[t]he case-law of the European Courts ... suggests that the Commission must analyse the 
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entirety of the circumstances surrounding a specific instance of a refusal to supply and must 
take its decision [on the basis of] the results of such a comprehensive examination.” 169 
In the Commission decision it was stated that a compulsory license should only be 
granted in exceptional circumstances
170
.  In the IMS case three cumulative conditions had to 
be met in order to be granted a compulsory licence, and the Commission applied those 
conditions to the Microsoft case: 1) the refusal relates to a product that is indispensable to the 
exercise of a particular activity in a neighbouring market; 2) the refusal is of such kind that as 
to exclude any effective competition on that neighbouring market; 3) the refusal prevents the 
appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand
171
. 
A refusal to license may be abusive and considered to violate article 102 TFEU unless 
the dominant company proves that the refusal has been objectively justified
172
. 
In the Microsoft case the IMS criteria was applied but the interpretation made was 
innovative, the expression “indispensability” gained a new meaning from the previous cases, 
the indispensability criteria is fulfilled if the IP in question is indispensable to compete 
viably
173
.  
Paragraph 390 states: “More specifically, the Commission considers that, in order to 
be able to be viably marketed, non-Windows work group server operating systems must be 
capable of participating in the Windows domain architecture…”174 
It was also found that the condition of eliminating competition was also fulfilled. The 
refusal created a risk of eliminating all effective competition:  
Paragraph 563 states: “What matters, for the purpose of establishing an infringement 
of Article 82 EC, is that the refusal at issue is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate all effective 
competition on the market…”175 
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In matters of IP rights and compulsory license seems that the essential facilities 
doctrine is not enough. It is a lot easier to perceive the indispensability of a physical facility. 
The focus in this IP cases seems to be if it is possible to do or to open a business without that 
license. 
Applying the essential facilities doctrine to the technological area may not be the best 
solution. Companies can start decreasing their investment in innovation and it disregards 
competition for the market, the essential facilities doctrine is more focused in safeguarding 
competition in the market. We also have the disincentive of investment made in innovation, 
by forcing a competitor to share their secrets and technology.  
The new product test appears as giving a higher threshold of protection but the reality 
is that even when the new product test is fulfilled, the right-holder when disclosing interface 
information’s is losing its proprietary work and the access control to its software.  
 
2. Striking the balance of competition for/in the market 
 
In the software market, when talking of a situation where there is competition using 
closed interfaces, consumer demand for network effects usually dictates to which firm the 
market will tip. This means that if we have two companies: company A and company B and 
both provide a software product, but company A has 10 000 users and company B has 1000 
the probability is that the market share will tip in favour of company A due to the higher 
networking effects that consumers are looking for. Because company A is already settled in 
the market with a strong network position, companies in this situation compete for the entire 
market share, for a monopoly position instead of competing in the market
176
. 
In the situation of open interfaces, companies do not compete for the network share 
because the interoperability between the different software’s is equal and users from company 
A and company B can communicate and access freely between them, this situation can indeed 
improve innovation
177
.  
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When companies are competing for network share they will tend to improve and 
create their auxiliary components, creating a wide variety of interoperable products and even 
decrease their price, however, innovation in the software per se will not be developed, leaving 
aside technological advances in this field
178
.  
Interface openness can eventually incentivize independents to create a huge number of 
components and programs that can increase consumer welfare and network effects. The 
downside is the potential loss of profits in the downstream market and because the 
accessibility to the interconnection with the software is so easy to everyone, security issues 
can become a threat. The Internet is a perfect example of interoperability openness that lead to 
a widespread popularity and content sharing, becoming what we know today. 
Because competitors know that in the software market, tipping, is very likely to 
happen, the competition will be for the market and not in the market. In the competition 
among vertical products, tipping is less relevant and the competition is made in the market. 
Market shares are more relevant in the first situation. 
Striking a balance between the both forms of competition could be a good way of 
enhancing competition. In a first assessment, having many competitors in the market is more 
competition friendly than just having one market actor, and sharing among competitors seems 
to lead to less innovation. Interface control is an inherent right given to companies, but at the 
same time, this control leads to competition for the market and restricts interoperability.  
The essential facilities doctrine is the exception to the rule, sharing as a mandatory 
obligation; it appears to give a confusing balance between competition for/in the market. It is 
confusing because it seems to be a temporary patch to solve a permanent problem, through an 
ex-post approach. It is required a more permanent solution and legislation on this matter, an 
ex-ante approach. 
 
2.1. Schumpeter`s analysis and critic 
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In Schumpeter’s opinion, competitors are interested in gaining the entire market share 
and not only part of it, not percentages but the totality, and that is a good mechanism for 
enhancing innovation
179. Gaining monopoly power isn’t harmful, instead, it gives the 
monopolistic company a better position to invest more in R&D because it has more economic 
power and it is in a better position to do so. The simple idea of losing the monopoly power 
should be enough concern for the dominant company to always invest in innovation.  
For companies to become dominant or to depose a dominant one they need to be more 
innovative, they need to bring to the market a product that consumers will prefer rather than 
one that has the higher networking. Effects of competition for the market are not only 
concerned with innovation, companies will also compete in prices; giving lower prices will 
also play a role in tipping. Windows and Apple are competing companies of software. The 
market in this case tipped to Windows where it takes advantage of more than fifty percent of 
market share
180
; however, it did not stop the innovation efforts due to the constant 
developments in innovation of Apple. 
The Schumpeterian position of incentives for innovation is controversial and lacks of 
empirical proofs. High barriers of market entrance can be dissuasive for competitors to enter 
in the market and lower barriers can stimulate innovation among the competitors and the 
dominant firm. The competitors because they want to increase market share and the dominant 
company because it does not want to lose market share.  
In terms of software this translates into openness or control of interfaces. Openness is 
considered a low entry barrier because competitors do not have to persuade consumers to 
change their network due to the possibility of interoperating with the previous network to 
which they belong. On the other hand control over interfaces can constitute an entry barrier 
for the opposite reasons; consumers will be reluctant to change due to the low network effects 
of the non-dominant companies. 
We can make some conclusions; competition in the market is related to openness of 
interfaces and interoperability easiness. Control of interfaces is exactly the opposite and is 
connected with competition for the market, competition to gain the entire market share. 
                                                          
179 For further development see, supra note 30. 
180 http://gs.statcounter.com/#desktop-os-ww-monthly-201511-201511-bar Last seen in 07-01-2016. 
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What is more likely to be pro-competitive?  The general acceptance is that having 
multiple competitors competing in the market will be more beneficial due to the high pressure 
from the different market actors.  
 
2.2. Vertical competition 
 
It is easy to perceive that interface control could be a way to gain access in secondary 
and vertical markets. If interface specifications were completely closed, secondary markets 
would eventually be controlled by the main software owners, leveraging their power from one 
market to another.  
In the vertical market we should bear in mind that interoperability is everything. Let’s 
take the media player example: a creator of a media player needs to interoperate with the 
software where the program is going to run. It needs accessibility to the disk, the ram, the 
display, etc. If such interoperability is not provided the only media player running on 
Windows software would be the Windows Media Player and the only media player running in 
Mac OS would be QuickTime.  
The media player market would be completely closed; there would be no competition, 
not even between the Windows and Mac media players because they would only run in the 
respective software’s. 
In vertical competition, interoperability easiness would incentive innovation. Inventors 
will more promptly invent a secondary component to interact with the software instead of 
inventing completely new software’s (something of higher difficulty and more market 
entrance barriers). Because it is relatively easier to compete in the downstream markets, 
inventors will be more predisposed to enter into those markets and subsequently increase 
competition and innovation. 
Because buyers buy those products at different stages the effects of control over 
interfaces are discussed mainly by the Chicago, post-Chicago and Harvard schools. The 
studies of these prior schools are important to understand the contemporary problems. As 
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Ludwig Von Mises said, “If we wish to understand the contemporary events we would do 
well to read the books written 20 or 30 years ago”181. 
 
2.3. Schools of Thought 
 
2.3.1. Harvard School 
 
According to this school the high concentration of market power by one company is 
harmful for country`s economy and politics. The S-C-P paradigm is developed by this school; 
it measures the harm to competition using different guides.  
The paradigm uses the relationship between structure, conduct and performance, this 
means that the market structure influences the conduct of a given company and in turn 
influences its performance
182
. 
One of the major concerns of the proponents of this theory was to restrict market 
power. For them it was important to achieve multiple objectives such as stability of the 
economy, distribution of equity and decentralization. They believe that markets are unstable 
and prone to failure. In their opinion large companies are prone to earn profits not by better 
efficiency but instead by market power, something that could be harmful to consumer 
welfare. 
High market power and high entrance barriers would eventually lead to price increase 
and collusion between companies, eventually leading to less consumer welfare. This school 
backed up their arguments in data from companies and case studies
183
. During the peak of 
Harvard school high interventionist powers were provided to the competition authorities and 
victims of the dominant enterprises were given more power and ways to protect their rights. 
One other point that was on the agenda, were the vertical restraints that they considered illegal 
and senseless. 
                                                          
181 F. Bohm, “Democracy and Economic Power” in Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law (Karlsruche: C.F. Muller, 1961) p. 36.  
182 Gormsen and Liza Lodvdahl. "A Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law". Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. p. 30. 
183 See, supra note 175; p. 31. 
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2.3.2. Chicago School 
  
The Chicago school unlike the Harvard school disregarded multiple goals, focusing in 
one main aspect, the economic efficiency. They were skeptical of the S-C-P paradigm and 
advocated for vertical restraints. 
 Bork, one of its main enthusiasts, alleged that the most important result should be 
enhancing the total welfare based on productive efficiency and surplus. He argued that 
allocative efficiency should be increased but without harming productive efficiency. This tells 
us that his main concern was consumer surplus. Consumer surplus models are not interested 
in wealth distribution they do not care about the identity of the market actors, what is 
important is the total welfare
184
.  
According to this school pursuing total welfare would be the best option for 
competition authorities due to the better consumer interest’s protection. This model is not 
devoid of sense; it would indeed make sense in a market where monopolies were unstable and 
easily broken up, something that could only be regarded as utopic.  
 Bork stated that markets should only be seen for their economic efficiency and should 
disregard the link to the political system due to its ever changing characteristics
185
. He 
defends the maximization of profits as doctrine. Competition law should only intervene in 
very exceptional circumstances since the market would be self-sufficient and auto-corrective. 
 The Single Monopoly Theorem
186
 is many times associated with the Chicago School. 
It argues that there is no interest in a monopolistic company to raise prices in an adjacent 
market, because consumers will only be willing to pay a monopolistic price once for the 
combined products. This means that if a company sells computers and keypads and keypads 
can be bought in another (competitive) market, the computer company to increase prices in 
the keypads will decrease the prices of computers. This leaves no incentive for monopolistic 
companies to increase prices of downstream products. 
                                                          
184 See, supra note 175; p.34. 
185 Bork, H. “"The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics".” Antitrust Law Journal (1985), p. 21- 24. 
186 For further development see Elhauge, Einer. “"The Failed Ressurrection of the Single Monopoly Theory".” Competition Policy 
International (n.d.). 
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2.3.3. Post Chicago School 
 
Economists moved from the Chicago School to the Post-Chicago School due to the 
realization of the ever-changing costs, information and also the volatile behaviour of 
consumers. 
Both schools, the Chicago and Post Chicago School agreed that the main concern for 
the anti-trust authorities should be one of economy. In what they do not agree is the market 
failure. In one side, we have the Chicago School who believes that markets tend to correct 
themselves and that imperfections are only temporary. In the other side, the Post-Chicago 
School tends to think that market failures are not self-correcting
187
 and that market actors will 
use those failures in their favour.  
Earlier it was mentioned that the Chicago School believed that monopolistic prices 
would only tend to be used in one product and only be accepted once by consumers. Those 
monopolistic companies could only enjoy monopolistic prices once and couldn’t leverage the 
power to other products. However, accordingly to the Post Chicago School, things are not as 
linear as above said, monopolistic companies can raise prices of products in a downstream 
market by foreclosure or tying
188
.  
The Single Monopoly Theorem also relies on companies that have an unchallenged 
position in the market, with no real threats to their power. However, in the fast-changing 
technological market, threats to monopolistic companies are very likely to happen and when 
that happens companies will leverage their power to other vertical markets, doing so, can be 
very profitable.  
The Single Monopoly Theory presumes that consumers are able to calculate the costs 
of both primary and secondary market products, treating both markets separately, however, 
consumers aren’t able to do so, they do not calculate and analyse the markets separately189. 
                                                          
187 See, supra note 175; p.38. 
188 Ibid. p.38. 
189
 For further development see, supra note 179. 
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Monopolistic influence in controlling secondary markets can decrease innovation. 
Control over interface information’s to leverage power into vertical markets can foreclose 
those secondary markets for complementary products. Openness could have the opposite 
effect, and it could lead to more innovation and more competition. 
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1. Comparison to the Telecommunications Law 
 
Taking the telecommunications law as an example, we can take some ideas in what 
regards the path to be followed in the field of software interoperability and interface 
openness.  
Telecommunications law incentivizes investment in infrastructures keeping at the 
same time a high level of interconnection between the different market operators, this happens 
with extensive ex-ante regulation.  
Interconnection and interoperability are two forms of gaining and enhancing network 
effects: interconnection is a simpler way of connection, it is made in an horizontal market, in 
the other hand, interoperability is more complex, it is made mainly in the vertical market and 
occurs at a more logical level and it implies more risks such as breaches in security 
(proliferation of virus due to the high number of network effects).  
Interconnection does not deal with IP issues and the problems are more related with 
infrastructures and prices as in the other side, interoperability has more legal issues that need 
to be overcome, but the analysis of the telecommunications law
190
 is a good starting point to 
overcome the lack of ex-ante regulation and the subsequent decrease of intervention by the 
competition authorities. 
When copyright law was created the major concern was to incentivize innovation and 
high thresholds were inputted by the legislators, interoperability issues were not taken into 
account at the time, copyright laws cannot keep up with the intense evolution of technology.  
The benefits of network effects were not taken into account and copyright law gives 
high thresholds of protection to software and to its interface, creating a big barrier to 
interoperability. In the telecommunications industry, telephones wouldn’t be of much use if 
they couldn’t connect with each other. They are considered a network product as in the 
software industry, the products do not have at the time that kind of mentality and they are 
considered individual products. 
                                                          
190 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on universal service and users rights to electronic communications 
networks and services; 2002. 
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In this paper we do not predict what the future will bring, but it seems likely that 
technological products and its connections become more and more part of our daily life and 
that interoperability is increasingly essential. Maybe in the future it could evolve from the 
characterization of individual products to network products that have little use by themselves.  
The internet of things is a good example, where glasses, watches, telephones, 
computers, TVs, surveillance cameras, freezers, cars, furniture, etc, are all connected and 
interoperable among them. An interactive piece of furniture by itself with no connection to 
other products such as our computer or telephone has little use and applicability, but when 
doing that interoperability, things evolve and change, it could be now regarded as a network 
product with an add value because of its interoperability. 
The problem with this comparison is that the products that could be interoperable, do 
present some other functions by themselves as in the interconnection of telephones that 
doesn’t happens. A telephone by itself is of no use (when talking about phones and not smart 
phones), whom are we going to call? Ourselves? It seems illogical. 
For those reasons, telecommunications law was focused since the beginning on 
maximizing network effects and in the computer programs that focus was left aside as a 
secondary objective. 
 
1.1. Early Regulation 
 
In the early days of telecommunications, the costs of implementing and building 
infrastructures were very prohibitive, giving rise to the idea that monopoly would be the only 
viable solution.  
To face the high costs of the infrastructures, there would need to exist a high number 
of subscribers, all contributing to the same purpose, the spread of telecommunications 
industries. The problem with the monopoly solution was the same as with all monopolies, it 
would give rise to high prices and the unfair maximization of profits due to the lack of 
competitors. The competent authorities were called to intervene and to control prices.  
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Due to the technological improvements, the costs of the infrastructures were reduced 
and the monopoly solution was considered obsolete. In the 80`s with the “Green Paper”191 the 
market was liberalized leaving aside the monopoly regulations. 
When removing the monopoly situation from the market, some points gained 
relevance, such as the interconnection between the different suppliers of telecommunications, 
and the removal of market barriers. Because now, there are different market actors supplying 
telecommunications services they could be prompted to impose barriers on connectivity with 
other market players and only provide connectivity between their respective costumers. 
The solution passes through the mandatory interconnection between the market 
players. Telecommunications law relies on standardization de facto and de jure
192
. In this 
situation we have clearly competition in the market and not for the market; it is more unlikely 
that the market will tip in favour of a single company. If interconnection was not mandatory, 
market barriers to new players would be too costly and impracticable. The users of a 
telecommunications services would be very reluctant to change due to the already high 
network effects. This is something that happens in the software market. 
 
1.2. Ex-ante over Ex-post protection 
 
The analysis of the telecommunications law can give us some light on what type of 
protection we should prefer when dealing with interoperability issues. The problem of using 
copyright to protect interface specifications is the broadness of protection given and the 
apparent lack of suitability
193
. As already mentioned, similar protection is given to interface 
information’s and to the software itself, it seems rather unfair that the software itself has a 
similar protection as the interface that the only job is to provide interoperability. 
When giving the copyright protection, it is given to market player’s, indiscriminate 
market power that in the future has to be corrected by the competition authorities. This 
problem could be corrected in an ex-ante situation as in the telecommunications law, more 
                                                          
191 Commission of the European Communities; “Green Paper on the development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services 
and Equipment”; 1987.  
192 Directive 2002/22/EC. 
193 See, supra note 8; pp.79, 80. 
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specifically in articles 14 to 17 of Directive 2002/22/EC
194
. In a first place it is given a general 
definition of what is considered market power. 
Article 14/2 states: “An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power 
if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that 
is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers
195.” 
Article 15 lists the procedure for the identification and definition of the markets. 
Article 16 presents the market analysis procedure. 
Article 16/4 states: “Where a national regulatory authority determines that a relevant 
market is not effectively competitive, it shall identify undertakings which individually or 
jointly have a significant market power on that market in accordance with Article 14 and the 
national regulatory authority shall on such undertakings impose appropriate specific 
regulatory obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article or maintain or amend such 
obligations where they already exist.
196” 
 Article 17 has an interesting text about interoperability and it deals with many 
questions about the standardization of interfaces. 
 Article 17/2 reads: “Member States shall encourage the use of the standards and/or 
specifications referred to in paragraph 1, for the provision of services, technical interfaces 
and/or network functions, to the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of services 
and to improve freedom of choice for users
197.” 
 Article 17/4 states: “The Commission shall take appropriate implementing measures 
and make implementation of the relevant standards compulsory by making reference to them 
as compulsory standards in the list of standards (...)
198” 
 We can perceive that the implementation of standards is encouraged in a first stage but 
the Commission reserves the ability to promote mandatory and compulsory standards. 
                                                          
194 Directive 2002/22/EC. 
195 Ibid; article 14/2. 
196 Ibid; article 16/4. 
197 Ibid; article 17/2. 
198 Ibid; article 17/4. 
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The copyright protection can be considered an impediment to interoperability since it 
promotes closing the interoperability information and leaves the ex-post regulation, case by 
case, as the best way to solve growing problems in this field. In terms of costs it all seems that 
a case-by-case analysis is more expensive due to the logistics and personal that is needed in 
the referred assessments. 
When talking about telecommunications we have to realize that using competition law 
to correct the earlier monopolies and high volume of subscribers would be an unsuitable 
method. The solution was to impose in an ex-ante situation a mandatory obligation to 
interconnect and to create suitable and specific ex-ante regulations to enhance the competitive 
process.  
Not imposing a mandatory obligation to interconnection would give rise to a high 
market share to one of the market actors. Leading possibly to a tipping case. In the 
interoperability and software situations, giving a high protection to interfaces is comparable to 
the telecommunications case in the way that it will give rise to high market shares for one of 
the market actors and eventually tipping the market. 
It seems that a proper ex-ante correction of market power is substantially more 
assertive than an ex-post one. When looking at article 102 TFEU a high market power and 
dominant position per se is not forbidden
199
. Market actors can achieve a dominant position 
by its higher innovation and better competitive processes, only the abuse of a dominant 
position has repercussions. However, high market power by itself can have negative 
repercussions on the competitive process
200
.  
Analysing article 106 TFEU we can perceive that the Member States also have an 
obligation to do ex-ante regulations and to enforce it in order to enhance the competitiveness 
in the market. 
Article 106 (1) states:  “In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which 
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor 
                                                          
199 See, supra note 21; pp.179-181. 
200 See, supra note 189; pp.607-621. 
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maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to 
those rules provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109.”201 
The application of article 106 TFEU is a complementary article to article 102 TFEU. 
The problem is that the application of this article is directed to exclusive rights granted by the 
States. IP rights are not exclusive rights granted by States to an undertaking and applying this 
article to interoperability matters and copyrights is not possible. However, we cannot 
disregard the comparison of the exclusive rights and the broad IP protection given to 
interfaces. We should take into account the ex-ante regulation given in article 106 TFEU
202
 
and possibly create a legislation based on these principles to the interoperability case, giving 
more responsibility to the Member States and decreasing the number of cases that fall into the 
competition authorities’ hands.  
If it is predictable that the lack of ex-ante legislation will lead to high market power 
and dominance, States should be called to legislate and contribute to enhance market 
competition in this field. 
Looking at the telecommunications legislation
203
 we can perceive that at the time of its 
creation there was an awareness that the high number of subscribers of one company
204
, 
would lead to a lack of competition and foreclosure of the market and ex-ante steps were 
taken to prevent it such as: the mandatory interconnection. In the interoperability case, even if 
there was no previous awareness of this interoperability importance and relevance, it should 
now be
205
and new forms of regulation are needed. 
It is of some importance to mention that the natural flow of the market should be in a 
first place, the creation of ex-ante regulations that will possibly generate a competitive market 
that then will be monitored by the competition authorities. 
                                                          
201 Article 106 TFEU.  
202 Ibid. 
203 Directive 2002/21/EC. 
204 Due to the previous monopoly power given and accepted by States. 
205 Due to the ever growing development in technology and the importance of interoperability between technological products. In the present 
day there is an increasing dependence on technology and in the future it might be seen as something indispensable to the normal function of 
the society in general.  
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The rules to interconnection according to the Access Directive are of a permanent 
basis and not temporary
206
, this takes into account the relevance of such interconnection not 
only to disperse the initial high market power and connections that date to the monopoly era 
but also to increase competition and innovation in the future.  
It must exist a high level of certainty for new competitors that desire to enter in the 
market; otherwise, small competitors will be reluctant to enter in the market due to the lack of 
certainty. The interconnection obligations are a must in the telecommunications industry
207
 
due to the strong effects of networking. Without a previous certainty of connection to the 
other operators and even if a new company provides better services and lower prices it is 
nearly impossible to effectively pierce into the market due to the reluctance of consumers to 
migrate to a company with low networking effects. 
An ex-post protection through competition authority does not give the required ex-ante 
certainty to new entrants; only ex-ante regulations will do the job. In the software industry the 
case is similar and an ex-ante protection would also be a good way of giving certainty. We 
should also consider that due to the uniqueness of both sectors (telecommunications and 
software) specialized regulations and standardization (in interconnection and interoperability) 
are necessary to increase the competitiveness in both sectors. 
 
1.3. Telecommunications Law as the basis for the Software Directive Amendment 
 
It will be further discussed and analysed what are the mechanisms of 
telecommunications law and its relevance for a possible amendment and changes to the 
Software Directive. 
The New Regulatory Framework (NRF)
208
 came to supersede the older regulatory 
frameworks in telecommunications law. The Framework Directive is a first approach to the 
role of the Commission and of the National Regulatory Authorities (NRA), as the Access 
Directive is the directive that specifies the access to the networks.  
                                                          
206 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002. 
207 Directive 2002/22/EC para. (8) and (25). 
208 Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications. 
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Telecommunications law is aimed at solving temporary and permanent problems of 
connection and network.   
As already referred, due to the type of industry and its network effects relevance there 
needs to exist certainty and at the same time flexibility, because new operators that want to 
access the market need to know that they will be able to interconnect with other operators 
(that already have many subscribers). Also, there needs to exist flexibility due to the 
complexity of interconnection costs and the uniqueness of those contracts. 
Accordingly to article 4(1) of the Access Directive, in a first situation there needs to be 
made a commercial contract approach between the operators: 
Article 4(1) states: “Operators of public communications networks shall have a right 
and, when requested by other undertakings so authorised in accordance with Article 4 of 
Directive 2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive), an obligation to negotiate interconnection 
with each other for the purpose of providing publicly available electronic communications 
services, in order to ensure provision and interoperability of services throughout the 
Community. Operators shall offer access and interconnection to other undertakings on terms 
and conditions consistent with obligations imposed by the national regulatory authority”209 
This obligation to negotiate interconnection access does take us into remembering the 
Software directive that also has the mechanisms to provide interoperability
210
. However, none 
of those two mechanisms provides practicable terms to the weaker part.  
 When analysing article 5 of the Access Directive we can perceive that the NRF 
imposes obligations to the NRA to control and regulate the interconnection between the 
different market operators, this is, it can intervene in the negotiations and assure that they are 
developing them in a correct way and that interconnection is going to be achieved.  
 Unlike the Software directive, and copyright law, where both grant high levels of 
protection to the software interfaces, in the telecommunications law, the control over the 
interconnection interfaces is restricted and limited.  
 Article 5 (1) reads: “National regulatory authorities shall, acting in pursuit of the 
objectives set out in Article 8 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), encourage and 
                                                          
209 Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive); article 4 (1). 
210 Directive 2009/24/EC; article 6. 
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where appropriate ensure, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, adequate access 
and interconnection, and the interoperability of services, exercising their responsibility in a 
way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, efficient investment and innovation, 
and gives the maximum benefit to end-users. In particular, without prejudice to measures that 
may be taken regarding undertakings with significant market power in accordance. 
 (ab) in justified cases and to the extent that is necessary, obligations on undertakings 
that control access to end users to make their services interoperable.”211 
 We can perceive that the NRA has an important role on controlling the application of 
the telecommunications law and that the services must be interoperable, this is, one of the 
cornerstones of the NRF on telecommunications, is all about increasing and securing effective 
market competition and interconnection. 
 The creation of a regulatory authority to control the interoperability in the software 
area could be an idea to retain from the telecommunications law example. It would be a 
mechanism to ensure that negotiations to grant access to interface information’s are conducted 
in a correct and equal way.  
 There is in fact a mechanism that is used to gain interoperability: the reverse 
engineering and decompilation provisions, however, those mechanisms do not always ensure 
interoperability, and they are also a very expensive way of reaching it. One other solution 
could be the modification of the provision that prohibits sharing the reverse engineering 
results. Companies should be able to share those costs. 
 Another telecommunications method of ensuring interconnection is the reference offer 
to which we should pay some attention and possibly duplicate it into the Software directive. 
 Article 9 (2) reads: “In particular where an operator has obligations of non-
discrimination, national regulatory authorities may require that operator to publish a reference 
offer, which shall be sufficiently unbundled to ensure that undertakings are not required to 
pay for facilities which are not necessary for the service requested, giving a description of the 
relevant offerings broken down into components according to market needs, and the 
associated terms and conditions including prices. The national regulatory authority shall, inter 
                                                          
211 Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive) article 5. 
 - 93 - 
 
alia, be able to impose changes to reference offers to give effect to obligations imposed under 
this Directive.” 
 The reference offer is intended to protect the weaker parts that enter into negotiations. 
It is a clause that ensures non-discriminatory methods of negotiation and accelerates the 
process, the NRA can intervene in this process, obligating the operators to amend or change 
the reference offers. This process makes it more difficult for whole operators with negotiating 
advantages to slow down the process. 
 This process of creating a reference offer should have good effects in the software 
directive. Taking into account that the software market is characterized by the strong network 
effects, companies with big market shares can easily use their strong negotiating power to 
slow down the interoperability negotiations, and apply unequal terms. If there were an NRA it 
could also intervene in the negotiating process and eventually correct contractual deficiencies, 
accelerating the process and making it more anti-discriminatory.  
 
2. Conclusions 
  
 Through the analysis of what was previously written we can state that interoperability 
is a subject of major importance in the technological world. The high value of networking in 
the IT market leads to an ever growing discussion on the level of protection that should be 
given to interfaces.  
 On one hand, low protection of interfaces can lead to a decrease of innovation; on the 
other hand, high protection of interfaces can lead to an increase of product prices and the 
appearance of monopolies detrimental to competition. 
 The current laws are ill suited to keep up with the fast growing technological market. 
When a technology is developed it boosts not only the technology of its current sector of 
activity but also many other sectors. That new technology is many times used to develop 
numerous other technologies and this leads to a snowball effect. The world as never 
experienced so much technological development as in the past few years. For example: When 
the smart phone was invented and introduced in the market, it led to the creation of other 
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technologies by other inventors, the apps, the countless accessories that improve the smart 
phone, toys that interact with the smart phone, furniture and automobiles that connect with the 
smart phone, etc. 
 There are methods to gain access to interfaces but in the authors’ point of view, those 
methods are many times disproportionate in what concerns the relation of costs/effectiveness.  
 The methods of reverse engineering and decompilation are associated with the 
Software directive in articles 5 and 6. But as we saw, the costs and time spent in those 
processes do not grant any certainty in achieving interoperability. The software right holder 
can change at any time the interoperability information leaving the other part with more 
expenses in decompiling and reverse engineering the same program. This situation seems 
rather unfair to the part that incurred into costs with the processes of decompiling and reverse 
engineering.  
 The Software directive does not include any kind of obligation to disclose 
interoperability information it only provides solutions (not mandatory) to achieve it. The 
problem is when a company does not possess the monetary fund’s to enter in such activities of 
decompilation and reverse engineering. One might argue that it can enter into negotiations 
with the right holder to enter into a licensing agreement; however, there is no obligation of the 
right holder to provide such licensing agreement. 
 We cannot forget to mention that the Software directive prohibits the disclosure of 
information achieved through decompilation and reverse-engineering, this is, small 
companies cannot come together to share the costs of this operation. 
 Competitors cannot engage in the processes of decompilation and reverse engineering 
when the information is readily available [article (6) (1) of the Software directive], the 
problem here lies with the lack of information in ascertain the amount of the information that 
needs to be disclosed in order to prevent the processes above mentioned.   
 In the authors view, it would be beneficial to provide some changes to the software 
directive such as: inclusion of more detailed information about the quantity of readily 
available information to be disclosed in order to prevent decompilation and reverse engineer; 
allow competitors to share the costs of decompilation and reverse engineer; give higher 
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certainty to competitors that dispend time and money in decompilation and reverse 
engineer
212
.  
 The author sees that problems of interoperability should be addressed mainly in an ex-
ante situation, leaving the ex-post intervention as little as possible. The telecommunications 
law is a good starting point and a good reference to give some possible changes to the 
Software directive.  
 We cannot forget that the market flow is made: in a first instance with the creation of 
good and effective ex-ante regulations and only in exceptional cases with the intervention of 
the ex-post authorities to correct market failures. Also, good ex-ante regulations give higher 
certainty and security to future investors, subsequently increasing the market competition. 
 In a first instance it should be implemented an article where the definition of market 
power is given and where a certain undertaking or joint undertakings have a market power 
that will decrease effective competition. In a second phase, it should be given to Member 
States, power to correct the market failures and remove the high market power from the 
undertaking/undertakings mentioned above.  
 It should be given to Member States power to encourage and if necessary mandatorily 
implement standards of interoperability. 
 To Member States should also be given the ability to impose mandatory obligations to 
undertakings to enter into licensing agreements in order to achieve interoperability. The 
Member States should create a competent authority to give proper and fair values to the 
agreements mentioned. Everything that was mentioned should have as a corner stone the 
publicity of the information’s in what concerns market power, interoperability standards and 
licensing agreements costs as well as all public interventions made in this sector. 
 It would be of some importance to implement a non-discriminatory clause as well as a 
proportionality clause to protect undertakings with less influence or monetary power 
 
 
                                                          
212 For example, if a competitor decompiles or reverse engineers a program, it should be given a period where if the right holder changes the 
interoperability information, that information should be granted to the competitor free of costs. 
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